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INTRODUCTION 
By the early 1960s, farmers in La Convencion Valley in 
southern Peru had broken away from the traditional hacienda 
system that had prevailed for over four centuries. Rural 
mobilization reached its peak in 1962 when the Peruvian 
government formally recognized the claims and sanctioned many 
of the demands of the striking peasant unions. 1 This process 
signaled the eventual disappearance of a system of social 
relationships that had revolved around the institution of the 
hacienda, reorganizing in the process the social interaction 
among the peasant communities operating independently of the 
hacendados. This was realized through the boycott of the 
hacienda owners by their arrendires in association with 
allegados and sub-allegados. 2 Despite its unique scope and 
success, the general strike of 1962 was but one manifestations 
of a wider rural movement that developed in La Convencion 
Valley. 
What were the conditions that made this area the seat of 
rural mobilization? What was the composition of the rural 
population? Which of the countryside's groups resisted the 
most? What were the motives for mobilization? How 
significant were the issues of land, taxes, ethnicity and 
clientelistic relations? Against whom was the antagonism 
directed? What distinguished regional from national 
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objectives? Finally, what political and cultural 
continuities can be discerned? 
To answer these questions, I will look at the local 
conditions as they are linked to a historical continuum. The 
settlement and exploitation of La Convencion Valley was a 
result of multiple events that shaped the institutional 
arrangements in the adjoining highlands during and after the 
Spanish presence. Therefore, it is important to account for 
the different social and economic controls that transformed 
the people in the highlands, who later migrated to the valley. 
Moreover, the same institutions would perform the same 
functions when established in the newly settled areas. 
In some areas, capitalism did not emerge from the 
internal social relations but instead was brought in through 
colonial or neocolonial connections . In those areas the 
complexity of social and economic relations is significant. 
Articulation of modes of production provides the context 
within which the process of capitalist penetration and the 
perseverance of noncapitalist cultural, economic, political, 
and social forms can be explained. Therefore, I will also use 
the concept of articulation of modes of production to examine 
the process of rural transformation through the changing 
nature of land ownership and patron-client relations. 
Understanding the nature of land ownership is important for 
tracing the patron-client ties, but in many developing 
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societies, such as Peru, personal relationships play a more 
important role. 
The concept of patron-client dynamics helps to reveal the 
relationship between opposing pairs of classes where the 
nature of land ownership does not suffice. Patron-client 
relationships are dyadic alliances that often appear as 
remedies to institutional deficiencies. The institution of 
agricultural tenancy provides such a case. Traditional rural 
patron-client relations tend to prevail in settings where the 
subordinates are heavily dependent upon the superiors and 
where the superiors need loyal personal dependents. The 
subordinates, or clients, are usually unskilled, legally 
unprivileged, forbidden to organize and generally subject to 
victimization. If this relationship fulfills such an 
essential role, what accounts for its decline? Such a 
relationship breaks down when either of the parties fails to 
fulfill its part, usually as consequence of changes in 
material conditions that render the relationship useless. 
My analysis of rural mobilization will distinguish 
between longitudinal, or long-term, and immediate, or 
short-term conditions, the mobilization itself; and to a 
lesser degree, the role of the state. Long-term or 
longitudinal background favoring peasant mobilization will be 
exemplified by such indicators as the change in the nature of 
land ownership, new economic activities, altered positions of 
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elites, and the process of class formation. The short-term 
conditions will include the decline in the return for labor, 
the worsening of market conditions, and the threats to 
recently achieved gains. The process of mobilization will 
take into consideration the formation of upward linkages, the 
nature of internal organization, and the strikes and legal 
struggles. Finally, I will account for the state's role as a 
fundamental player in the historical problem of rural 
mobilization. 
A word of clarification with respect to the subject of 
this study, that is, the peasant. I will use the term peasant 
to mean a rural cultivator from whom an economic surplus is 
extracted, freely or coercively, by a nonproducing class. 3 
Thus used, the term is not intended to imply that peasants 
form a single class. 
This work is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1, 
evaluates the existing theoretical approaches concerning 
peasant mobilizations. Chapter 2, part one, surveys the 
history of peasant rebellions in the southern Peruvian 
highlands from the conquest to the twentieth century; part 
two, examines the history and special conditions present in La 
Convencion Valley. Chapter 3, presents an overview of the 
hacienda system in La Convencion Valley, with its unique 
characteristics -availability of land and shortage of labor. 
It also accounts for the development of capitalist 
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agriculture, emphasizing the consequences for the 
tenant-farmer population. Furthermore, it discusses the 
issues of labor, patron-client relations, and the specific 
relations of production encountered in the valley up to the 
period of mobilization. Chapter 4 addresses the issue of the 
mobilization itself in three stages: first and second 
protests and the resulting changed relations. Finally, 
chapter 5 takes up the process of class formation as the 
outcome of the mobilization and addresses the theoretical 
considerations that pertain to this case. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Approaches to Peasant Studies 
Western social scientists have long been interested in 
mobilization among lower classes in developing nations. 
Karl w. Deutsch introduced the concept of mobilization in the 
early 1960s, considering it "an essential prerequisite" for 
modernization. He defines mobilization as 
the process in which major clusters of old social, 
economic, and psychological commitments are 
eroded ... and people become available for new 
patterns of socialization and behavior including 
potential or actual involvement in mass politics. 4 
The study of this phenomenon became even more important 
in the late 1960s, when scholars were trying to explain the 
events taking place in the Third World. It became apparent, 
moreover, that the agrarian question was important in 
understanding development in both the Western and non-Western 
worlds. 
Samuel Huntington, in Political Order in Changing 
Societies, looks at the degrees of institutionalization of a 
society for evidence of political development. 
revolution, like other forms of violence and 
instability, is most likely to occur in societies 
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which have experienced some social and economic 
development and where the processes of political 
modernization and political development have lagged 
behind the process of social and economic change. 5 
By political modernization, Huntington means the 
mobilization and politicization of new groups into the system; 
by political development, he conceptualizes the creation of 
political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, 
autonomous, and coherent to absorb and order the participation 
of new groups and to promote change. 
In Huntington's view, the difference between the city and 
the countryside increases as consequence of modernization. The 
expansion of political participation is reflected in the 
changing relationship between city and countryside and their 
respectively changing patterns of stability and instability. 6 
In a traditional society, power rests in the hands of the 
rural elite and is based on the elite's control of land in the 
countryside along with complete domination over the peasantry. 
Political participation is low and limited to the clergy, 
aristocracy, landowners, ranking military, and bureaucracy. 
With the advent of new economic activities, new social groups 
emerge. 
other 
Migration to the cities may involve contact with 
groups and the development of a new social 
consciousness. In countries that come late to modernization, 
the key to stability lies in the extent to which rural masses, 
7 
the peasants and other strata, are mobilized into politics 
within the existing political system rather than as external 
agents bent on the system's liquidation. Huntington writes 
the timing and the method and auspices of the Green 
Uprising thus decisively influence the subsequent 
political evolution of the society. 7 
But he also stresses that "rural instability is major but 
avoidable. 8 In Huntington's analysis, the degree to which 
mobilized and politicized rural masses are incorporated the 
system depends on the urban elite, the intellectuals and the 
military. Huntington recognizes that, although the peasants' 
actions have important political consequences, they are not 
capable by themselves of effectuating change. 
Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy represents one of the earliest statements on the 
role of the peasants. In Moore's analysis, the rise of 
agrarian capitalism strongly affects the subsequent course of 
political development. Moore emphasizes the structural 
differences that develop during the course of modernization, 
and claims that the character of the link between the peasant 
community and the overlord is important. 9 The relationship 
is conditioned by two factors: availability of land and 
adequate social institutions to encourage political 
stability • 10 
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For Moore, the division of labor and community solidarity 
are closely related, because in association with new sudden 
impositions may lead to the development of revolutionary 
potential of the peasantry. In a radical form of solidarity, 
the institutional arrangements spread grievances through the 
peasant community, seek equitable distribution of scarce 
resources, and turn the peasants into a unified group hostile 
to the overlord. The conservative type of solidarity, based 
on the division of labor, inhibits political action, and leads 
to changes that would be more reformist in nature. This form 
of solidarity is the more modern phenomenon. 11 
The commercialization of agriculture is not in itself a 
sufficient condition for rural mobilization. To Moore the 
elite's reaction to change is critical in determining whether 
or not there is large scale unrest. The revolutionary 
potential is not sufficient; to be effective, it must be 
directed, and it must have allies. 
Theda Skocpol approaches the study of the peasant-
overlord relationship from a similar perspective. 12 Like 
Moore, Skocpol, assigns important roles to the peasants and to 
community solidarity, emphasizing the importance of structural 
conditions: the degrees and kinds of solidarity in peasant 
community, the degrees of peasant autonomy or control by 
landlords or agents, and the relaxation of the state's 
coercive sanctions against the peasants' collective action. 
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It is only with economic and social change that class struggle 
plays an important role and the peasantry becomes part of it. 
Skocpol advises that, in examining class relations in the 
countryside, the analysis of the different strata of property 
holders is not enough. It may be misleading; hence attention 
should be given to 
the historically specific institutional 
arrangements by which two analytically basic kind 
of social relationships are simultaneously 
established: the relationship of direct producers 
to one another, to their tools, and to the land in 
the immediate process of production; and the 
relationship to the overlord, by which product is 
extracted from the direct producer by a class of 
nonproducers. 13 
According to Skocpol, autonomy and solidarity may be 
built on these agrarian structures, depending upon the 
institutional form they take: serfs, laborers, a rentier 
agrarian system with smallholder peasant communities. The 
nature of the ties, which define the method of appropriation, 
is important in the analysis of the penetration and 
development of capitalism. Furthermore, Skocpol attempts to 
establish a pattern of peasant behavior that 
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transcends spotty and localized unrest and that 
accomplishes something very different from peasant 
based rebellions. 14 
That is, the timing of the peasants' revolutionary potential 
in conjunction with the political crises of the autocratic 
states in the context of world historical development is of 
essence. 
Joel Migdal, in Peasants, Politics and Revolutions, 
provides a systematic theory of how imperialistic modernizing 
forces impinge on peasant villages, and how peasants in turn 
are likely to respond. 
in the past fifty years, peasants in certain areas 
have engaged in prolonged national struggle to 
change the system of government and the 
distribution of power. These movements have not 
been based on a sudden burst of violence after 
frustration was built, as was often true, of 
spasmodic, anomie peasant rebellions of the past 
centuries. Rather, peasants in these cases have 
engaged in a long drawn -out revolutions in a 
variety of institutionalized ways -as political 
cadres, as disciplined soldiers, as loyal suppliers 
of food, money and shelter, and as active and 
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passive members of a host of revolutionary 
organizations and groups. 15 
Here Migdal is concerned with how an anomie revolutionary 
participation became institutionalized. He argues that in the 
twentieth century, developing countries have been undergoing 
disruptive economic transitions from a predominantly 
"inward-orientation" marked by subsistence agriculture and 
strong communal and patronage control to an 
"outward-orientation" marked by substantial involvement of 
individual peasants and households with extra-local markets, 
cash, and wage labor. 16 According to Migdal, the peasant who 
undergoes the most rapid exposure to the market forces would 
be the one to respond to political stimuli, to get involved in 
movements that offer solutions to market-induced problems. 
The traditional peasant, in Migdal's analysis, by wanting to 
maintain the status quo, defends his minimal security, becomes 
more inward oriented, and so eventually develops into a 
revolutionary. 
Migdal claims that newly strengthened national states, 
with their extensive bureaucratic apparatus, are instrumental 
in developing a form of capitalism, which promotes 
commercialization and affects agrarian class relations and 
peasant communities and thus is the root of peasant-based 
revolutions. But the peasantry, he also acknowledges, is weak 
in organizational ability, possessing relatively little 
12 
education or organizational expertise. Consequently, the 
mobilization of the peasantry will be preceded by the 
development of a superstructure by external leaders. 
Migdal acknowledges the usefulness of the concept of 
culture contact, but cautions that attaching too much 
significance to it may create distortion, 
Culture contact as an explanation fails to take 
account of the differentiation between two distinct 
concepts in social science, social mobilization and 
modernization. 17 
Migdal advises that to rely too much on the culture 
contact concept may not suffice in understanding cases where 
social mobilization did take place but did not lead to 
modernization, such as in the case of certain millenarian 
movements. Because simple exposure to the modern is not 
sufficient to change culture, an experience such as an 
economic crisis will cause structural changes in favor of the 
outward-oriented forces. Therefore, Migdal emphasizes that 
historical forces have to be considered in the context of the 
specific pressures peasants face in their relationship with 
other classes. 
Eric Wolf also acknowledges the effects of the spread of 
capitalism, in Wolf's case "North Atlantic capitalism." It is 
largely as a consequence of this process that land and labor 
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became commodities. According to Wolf, industrialization and 
expanded markets gave rise to new social arrangements that 
would affect the peasants, who were 
as yet unsure of their own social positions and 
interests but forced by the imbalance of their 
lives to seek adjustments . 18 
At this stage, Wolf emphasizes the importance of peasant 
community solidarity and its degree of autonomy. Thus, 
"dislocated" peasants become available to engage in organized 
political efforts to effectuate change. Furthermore, not all 
peasants become active. The middle and land-free are the 
likeliest candidates, 
because the former are thoroughly caught up in the 
tension of transition from rural agrarian economy 
to an urban capitalism, and the latter are the 
least subject to the power of the landlords and to 
continuing attachment to the land. 19 
The very attempt of the middle peasants to remain 
traditional is what makes them revolutionary. For Wolf, the 
crucial insurrectionary capacity is exhibited by communal 
holding peasants, in the material and organizational 
advantages their situation offers for collective resistance 
against the outside pressures. In this sense Wolf and Migdal 
arrive at similar conclusions. Wolf declares that the peasant 
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middle stratum would be most likely to mobilize for action 
and would need leadership from outside the community: 
poor peasants and landless laborers therefore are 
unlikely to pursue the course of rebellion unless 
they are able to rely on external power to 
challenge the power that constrains them. 20 
Wolf suggests that one must analyze more than the situation of 
the peasantry and the agrarian economy in order to understand 
peasant participation in social changes. One also must look 
at the role of the state. Rather than imbuing the state with 
an active role, as does Skocpol, Wolf's state has a passive 
role. 
At the center of James c. Scott's theory is the village 
community, where the autonomous social and cultural structures 
create the peasants' moral economy. The moral economy of the 
village is a consequence of a local system of action, 
influence, and authority that is 
to some degree isolated from the outside. It 
constitutes a distinct sphere of perception and 
information and above all, moral obligation (i.e., 
social sanctions) that tends to exclude outsiders. 
Such localism serves to differentiate the village 
not only from other villages but also from the 
world of external elites above it. 21 
15 
Unlike Wolf or Moore, who describe the peasant 
communities as unwitting agents of change, Scott ascribes to 
them a more direct role. When faced with the expansion of 
capitalism in the form of market and the rise of centralized 
states, peasants turn to the community bonds of solidarity in 
directing their resistance. 22 Scott expresses doubt, though, 
as to whether the peasantry has the cultural and 
organizational autonomy to resist the regular impact of the 
hegemony of the ruling classes. 23 He argues that the 
landholding play the greatest role in resisting change. 
Sharecroppers and tenants are unlikely to enjoy any degree of 
autonomy; therefore they would be less prone to mobilize. 
Samuel Popkin's Rational Peasant provides us with another 
approach to the study of peasant participation in revolutions. 
Popkin claims that community solidarity approaches tend to 
overestimate the stability, welfare, and benefits that 
traditional peasants gain from the patron-client and village 
relationships. The village institutions have built-in 
tensions and the population is stratified. For Popkin, the 
exploitation of the peasant through this patron-client 
relationship is a permanent incentive for the peasant to seek 
change. Some peasants may actively try to break out of 
tradi tiona! relationships by developing new ties with traders, 
middlemen who could offer better opportunities 
16 
Throughout the world, the peasants have fought for 
access to markets not as a last gasp when all else 
failed them, but when they were secure enough to 
want to raise their economic level and "redefine" 
cultural standards 124 
Popkin contends that mobilization will occur as a result 
of individual self-interest, rather than as a function of a 
pre-existing group solidarity. The individual peasant's 
development is defined as a 
growing ability to organize and struggle for rights 
and privileges previously denied him. 25 
In Popkin's analysis, the central state is not 
automatically a threat to the peasantry; on the contrary, it 
can be an ally in the process of development 
[T]he strong peasant property and the absolutist 
state developed in mutual dependence upon one 
another. The state increased its power by virtue 
of its ability to get between the landlord and the 
peasant, to ensure peasant freedom, hereditability 
and fixed rents, and thus to use peasant 
production ... as the direct source of revenue for 
royal strength and autonomy. 26 
17 
Popkin's 
abilities of 
conclusions on the actual organizational 
the peasantry coincide with Migdal's: the 
peasants need outside allies and guidance. 
Charles Tilly's work represents the political-conflict 
approach and, in Lynn Hunt's words, 
like E.P. Thompson and George Rude, Tilly wants to 
rehabilitate the "mob" or what historians less 
pejoratively label the "crowd. "27 
Tilly's agenda is historical, and he is interested in how 
"collective action" in Europe evolved under the long-term 
structural changes. According to Tilly, the structural 
changes have altered the means and ends of collective action. 
In his view, the masses are continuously confronting 
widespread structural changes which in effect condition the 
rules of collective action. In the study of the development 
of collective action on the "ways that people act together in 
pursuit of shared interests" he acknowledges an evolutionary 
pattern. Therefore, 
the proactive types of collective action appear 
superior to competitive or reactive types, since 
with proactive types of collective action such as 
strikes and demonstrations, ordinary people are 
able to assert new group claims through formal 
18 
organizations that effectively compete in a 
national political arena. 28 
Tilly defines collective action as "people acting 
together in pursuit of "common interest"; he considers this 
definition is less ideologically loaded than "class struggle." 
In analyzing "collective action" he is interested in the 
degrees of organization, the amount of resources under 
collective control, and their relationship to government and 
other opposing groups. For Tilly, the goal of collective 
action is political power. While for Marxist analysts the 
political contests are aimed at the level of changing social 
relations of production, for Tilly they are located at the 
level of changes in the organization of production. When he 
considers the effects of industrialization, he focuses on 
long-term structural changes such as proletarianization rather 
than on social relations themselves. 
Tilly calls attention to the importance of interest and 
opportunity, because 
people act 
collective 
collectively 
gains, and they 
to 
do 
maximize their 
so within the 
constrains set by the cost of such collective 
action. 29 
The peasants' dissatisfaction stems from the realization 
that their material hardships are much worse, and not 
19 
inevitable, and that their goals do not coincide with those of 
other classes. The peasants' goals are to improve on their 
immediate economic and social conditions - their life work. 
Their concern with immediate changes does not set them apart 
from urban laborers. What differentiates them is that their 
economic situation is worse than that of the urban 
proletariat, and the choices available to them. 
For the peasantry a more equitable distribution of the 
land is the prerequisite to economic growth. The ultimate 
goal of the most peasants is the ownership of the means of 
production, that is, the land. Therefore, land redistribution 
becomes an issue of critical importance because it represents 
not just an increase in the peasants' economic well-being, but 
a reordering of basic social relationships that had previously 
existed between the peasant and landlord. 
From a Marxist perspective, a reordering of basic social 
relationship is the goal of the revolutionary struggle; and 
for a revolutionary strategy to be successful it must be based 
on a scientific analysis of the existing social reality, and 
in particular the actual state of class struggle. According 
to Marx, the preconditions for the rise of capitalism in 
England and Continental Europe were, first, the dispossession 
of the peasantry, and second, their employment as 
wage-laborers. 
20 
Marx did not categorize the peasantry as a social class, 
although in his analysis of the peasantry under the 
Bonapartist regime in France, he makes a clear distinction 
between the "revolutionary" and the "conservative" peasant. 
Marx studied the conditions under which different kinds of 
rent arise and the introduction of the money rent presented a 
departure point for the development of capitalist relations. 
These conditions would be directly related to differentiation 
and polarization among the peasants. 30 Marx was aware that 
certain elements, if not the entire peasantry, could 
constitute a revolutionary force against the established 
order. Furthermore, he points to the urban proletariat as the 
natural ally and leader of the peasantry. 
Lenin, using Marx's conceptualization of the peasantry, 
developed a more elaborate analysis of the peasants in 
undeveloped countries. He warned against a rigid 
interpretation of the Marxist thesis, emphasizing that while 
the separation of the direct producers from the land is a 
result of capitalist development, capitalist penetration of 
the agricultural sector is a slow process. Lenin found that 
in nineteenth-century Russia, peasants renting land was 
commonplace, and took three main forms: money rents, 
sharecropping or produce rents, and labor service. The nature 
and the amount of rent as well as the obligations were 
different for different "classes of peasantry." Renting 
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served to accentuate the differences within the peasantry. 
The richer peasants leased more land on a cash rent basis; the 
poorer ones leased land more on taxing terms, which involved 
produce rent or labor services. The poorer peasants leased 
land to subsist and the rich to enlarge their surplus. For 
Lenin the issue of the nature of tenure, its impact on 
productivity and change were linked to the totality of class 
relations. Lenin recognized the crucial role of the peasantry 
and adapted the Bolshevik program and tactics, at least for 
the initial stage, to the need to win the peasants' support. 
Mao went well beyond Lenin's theoretical formulations. 
He realized that, in prerevolutionary China, the peasants were 
the main revolutionary class and the "motor of the Chinese 
revolution" under the leadership of the proletariat. Mao made 
an important contribution to Marxist theory on the 
differentiation of the rural classes and the revolutionary 
potential of the poor peasantry dominated by the society. 
Marxist scholars interested in the peasantry in Latin 
America have utilized the formulations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
and Mao to examine and interpret the conditions of the 
peasantry in the present Latin American societies. 
Historically, transitions and transformations take a 
dialectical path defined by the class struggle. Therefore, to 
understand the development of agrarian capitalism and the form 
it takes in rural Latin American conditions, the analysis 
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must be done at the locus of class conflict and the 
reproduction of class relations. 
For Jeffery Paige, the unit of analysis is the class 
relationship between "cultivators" and "noncultivators. "31 
A revolution is "on the agenda" when the upper-class 
"noncultivators" derive their income from land only and not 
from capital. Under these conditions the upper class is 
forced, by its structural position, to refuse concessions to 
the cultivators. Paige admits that whether peasants become 
revolutionary or not depends on the capacities of the peasants 
themselves, and that participation is based on the abilities 
of the lower-class cultivators. 
Paige thus arrives at a different conclusion from those 
of James Scott and Eric Wolf. For Paige, the smallholding 
peasant, because he derives his livelihood from the land 
ownership, would be dominated by the upper class. 
Furthermore, the landholding peasants are mutually isolated 
and internally competitive, averse to taking risks, and 
strongly dependent upon the upper classes. Their response to 
market exploitation would take the form of a "reform commodity 
movement. " Rather that as wage earners, propertyless laborers 
are identified by Paige as revolutionaries against landed 
upper classes, because they are more likely to exhibit group 
solidarity and deliberate support. 
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Among the propertyless, he distinguishes between 
migratory labor service and sharecropping systems. The 
migrant laborers are seasonal wage labor, and when unemployed 
they return to their village, where many own a small plot of 
land. They lack organized political coherence. Their 
grievances tend to combine with those of other village strata 
and, according to Paige, to create "revolutionary nationalist 
movements." Only sharecroppers in Paige's view, because of 
their numbers, their homogeneity, and the nature of their 
contractual agreement with the landlord, are vulnerable to 
Communist ideology and powerful political parties. Paige 
contends that these affiliations are internally generated to 
form the basis of a socialist revolution. 32 
For the Marxists, the issues of transition to capitalism 
and of how "feudal" or "capitalist" were the relations of 
production in the countryside were the main contentions 
regarding the dependency approach, which has been used to 
analyze limited levels of development characteristic of 
countries that were incorporated late into the world system. 
While most adherents of the dependency approach have 
looked at the "external factors" creating the condition of 
underdevelopment, Fernando Henrique Cardoso stressed the 
"internal factors" and especially the struggle between the 
classes. He aims at establishing a methodology for the 
analysis of concrete situations of dependency by emphasizing 
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the importance of the historical processes that created the 
structures favoring dependent development. 
The analytical theory dealing with the modes of 
production evolved from the criticism of dependency. A 
derivative of it is the approach of the articulation of modes 
of production, as an analytical tool that examines social 
transformations by focusing on class divisions within the 
agricultural sector. The patron-client relationship is the 
standard description of elite-mass relations and is an 
important aspect of emerging capitalist mode of production. 
A mode of production incorporates specific historical 
combination of forces and relations of production. Each mode 
of production determines a particular mode of appropriation of 
surplus labor; that is, a surplus of the product of labor over 
and above the costs of the maintenance of labor. Actual 
societies are composed of more than one mode of production, 
all of which together create a socioeconomic formation, or a 
social formation. The major modes of production analyzed by 
Marx were the primitive community, the slave-based society, 
the feudal society based on serfdom, the bourgeois society 
based on capitalist mode of production, and the communist 
society. 33 
Current use of the concept of modes of production is 
related to social scientists' interest in the growth and 
spread of capitalism into the Third World. Of special 
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interest are the conditions under which the capitalist and 
precapitalist relations could coexist, and the conditions 
under which precapitalist tenurial relationships have been 
incorporated by the capitalist relations. The idea of 
"articulation" facilitates a more complex analysis of these 
conditions than the simple "combination" or "coexistence" of 
the modes of the production. 
For Harold Wolpe, articulation is 
the relationship between the reproduction of the 
capitalist economy on the one hand and the 
reproduction of the productive units organized 
according to precapitalist relations and forces of 
production on the other. 34 
Therefore, an articulated mode of production is 
a complex structure doubly articulated by the 
productive forces connexion and the relations of 
production connexion. 35 
Pierre-Phillipe Rey, in Les Alliances de classes, defined 
and developed the concept of articulation of modes of 
production in order to illuminate political questions. 
Additionally, he distinguishes three stages of articulation as 
historical possibilities: 
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1. an initial link in the sphere of exchange, 
where interaction with capitalism reinforces the 
precapitalist mode; 2. capitalism "takes root" 
subordinating the precapitalist mode but still 
making use of it; 3. (not yet reached by the 
Third World) the total disappearance of the 
precapitalist mode, even in agriculture. 36 
According to Aidan Foster-Carter, in Rey' s 
conceptualization, capitalism's logical final goal is the 
destruction of antecedent modes of production and relations of 
production to replace them with its own mode of production and 
relations of production. Therefore violence is needed, with 
exception in its articulation with feudalism. For Rey, 
articulation is a "process in time" that will essentially deal 
with the problematic of the transition to capitalism in the 
Third World countries. 37 Rey envisioned the workings, in 
two stages, the transitional modes of production and the phase 
of neo-colonialism because of "capitalism's increasing ability 
to look after itself. "38 
Patterns of class opposition and alliance directly 
reflect the degree of articulation of capitalist and 
precapitalist modes of production. 
client relationships will change 
The nature of patron and 
as the patterns of class 
alliances and opposition of a society change. 
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In a recent study titled Rural Transformation and Peasant 
Political Orientations in Egypt and Turkey, Dani Rodrick 
writes 
The tendency of most authors 
implicitly that the political 
is to 
outlook 
assume 
of the 
peasantry is simply a derivative of the ideology of 
the mobilizing elite. Based on this assumption the 
peasantry is endowed with a certain political 
momentum but denied direction. 39 
While Rodrick does not deny that the peasants are incapable of 
a "concerted political action," he argues that 
the range of political action the peasantry is 
likely to participate, is determined by the rural 
processes rather than by elite preferences. 
Different processes of change will leave some 
peasant societies more conservatively oriented than 
others, and some more radically oriented. 40 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
pressures from outside, especially the spread of world market, 
set changes in motion. The presence of an elite with 
"local-orientation" maintained and strengthened patron-client 
relations. Hence, peasants whose orientation was thus shaped 
was most receptive to elite ideological inclinations parallel 
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to their political inclinations. In the case of an elite with 
"nation-orientation," the countryside was characterized by 
absentee ownership and the development of a rural middle 
class. By comparison to the absentee owners, this middle 
class had quite limited economic resources; therefore the 
potential patronage was also restricted. The structural 
weakness of the patron-client ties in the countryside 
permitted the peasantry to align themselves with a different 
set of elites. 
Finally, there is the approach suggested by Steve J. 
Stern. Regarding the study of peasant mobilization, he writes 
The study of peasants and agrarian conflict is a 
field too sophisticated, diverse and politically 
charged to descent into a stale of uniformity. 41 
"Despite few notable dissents," says Stern, four views 
characterize the peasant studies. The first emphasizes the 
destructive impact of the expansion of the capitalist market 
economy. The second claims that the penetration of capital ism 
speeds up the process of internal differentiation of the 
peasant society into bourgeois farmers, and middle and 
landless peasants. In the third, agrarian conflict has an 
impact on the political history of the countries where the 
rural sector contains the majority populations. The fourth 
view holds that the peasants are defensive "reactors" to 
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external changes, that is, that peasants as political actors 
have a parochial character. 
Therefore Stern, pointing to the experience of the 
peasants in the Andean highlands, suggests a 
rethinking of the assumptions and paradigms in four 
areas: the role of the peasants as continuous 
initiators in political relations; the selection of 
the appropriate time frames as units of analysis in 
the study of rebellion; the diversity of peasant 
consciousness and political horizons; and the 
significance of the ethnic factors in explaining 
"peasant" consciousness and revolt. 42 
Based on these guidelines, the idea of peasants as 
continuous initiators in political relations is of fundamental 
relevance. Because most peasant studies emphasize peasant 
political actions during times of crisis and relegate 
peasantry to the background of the political picture during 
normal times, those studies fail to understand peasant 
politics during those quiescent times, and thereby offer 
incomplete explanations to the causes of rebellion. 
Consequently, Stern points to an alternative approach to the 
study of peasant insurrection by looking at the 
evolution of preexisting patterns of "resistant 
adaptation" that entailed innovative political 
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engagement of the state by the peasants. In this 
perspective, the relevant question becomes not why 
a politically dormant and traditionalist peasant 
mass suddenly becomes insurrectionary, but rather 
why, at specific moments, ongoing peasant 
resistance and self-defense increasingly took the 
form of collective violence against established 
authority. 43 
Hence, to analyze mobilization in the Andean region, one must 
look at the peasants' political activities as 
continuously involved in the shaping of their 
societies, sometimes in a role of political 
initiators, not mere reactors, and often exerting 
an important limiting impact on their superiors and 
on "external" actors or systems. This perspective, 
in turn, serves as a prerequisite for understanding 
the causes and character of political unrest in 
the Andes . 44 
To achieve this approach is to view peasant protest as a 
short-term variant in a long-term process of resistance and 
acconunodation to authority Stern suggests conceiving of it as 
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an analysis that successfully incorporates multiple 
time scales into its vision of rebellion and its 
causes. 45 
He also advises the use of "long-term frames of reference." 
In other words, the analysis of peasant protest should include 
the relevant period in the peasants' own historical memory, 
which Stern defines as "slice of peasant consciousness." This 
approach will aid in distinguishing between 
genuinely new patterns of collective violence and 
grievance, and repetitions of historic cycles of 
resistance and accommodations that occasionally 
included some forms of collective violence. 46 
Studies of peasant protest in the Andean highlands should 
pay particular attention to the cultural history of the area 
under study, with respect to the other factors influencing 
peasant mobilization. It is impossible, though, to overlook 
the dependent state that is a characteristic of most of 
late- developing countries. Neo-colonialism in the rural 
areas creates special conditions that inhibit the development 
of capitalist mode of production and relations of production 
and maintain the precapitalist relations of production. 
If peasant activism is not a recently emerging 
phenomenon, then what made it possible for the peasants to 
begin to make inroads? The general answer is that the 
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society, rural and urban, was undergoing profound changes that 
created conditions more conducive for rural mobilization. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Part One 
Rural Protest In Southern Peru: A Historical Review 
The Andean people in the highlands of southern Peru is 
relevant, have continuously engaged in forms of protest 
sometimes as political initiators, not only as reactors, and 
often exerting an effect on their local superiors and on 
external actors or structures. 47 
Peasants, by definition, interact with their landlords 
and state structures; and in the Andes this political 
inheritance includes centuries of experience that partly 
defines the issues in this study. Thus, for peasants the 
relevant time scales include not only the most recent changes, 
but centuries of struggle over the land. All of this 
experience defines the peasants' understanding of accurate 
rights and obligations in their relationship with the state. 
The Formative Era 
After the Incas became established in the area of Cuzco 
in the fifteenth century, they embarked on a systematic 
conquest throughout the Andes. 48 In the process of building 
their empire, the Incas relocated and imposed the Quechua 
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language on the people thus conquered to maintain strict 
supervision, exercise social control and exact tribute. By 
1531, when the Spaniards began their conquest, the Inca empire 
was divided by contests for succession between the royal 
families of Cuzco and Quito. 
The Spaniards were colonizers but lacked their own labor 
force, and consequently, they settled in areas where the 
indigenous population was concentrated. Their first goal was 
to find immediate subsistence while they collected booty; 
their second was to find labor to put to work on the local 
resources to guarantee permanent subsistence and produce 
wealth, preferably in exportable form. Once the pillage had 
run its course, means were found to incorporate the natives 
into the developing colonial society through the encomienda, 
and to re-settle through the reducciones, under the close 
supervision of a priest. 49 
Under the trusteeship system of the encomienda, 
uncontrolled use of native labor degenerated into ruthless 
exploitation. 50 The policy of reducciones was ordered by 
royal decree after the defeat of Inca Manco Capac's rebellion. 
It is estimated that about 1.5 million Indians were involved 
in this project, and the reducciones are the origin of what 
later would be called comunidades. 51 From the perspective of 
the Spanish crown, the lands held by the ayllus were corporate 
holdings, claimed by the community as a whole. This policy 
35 
was aimed at facilitating evangelization, but had more 
important effects in terms of economic and political control. 
During the colonial period, through direct levies, the crown 
extracted the surplus produced by the communities, and access 
to labor force was closely linked to political control. The 
relocation of the indigenous population contributed seriously 
to the disruption of agricultural activities and furthered 
epidemics. 52 
At the regional level, the administration of the crown's 
affairs was entrusted to a corregidor de indios. The 
corregidor was the bridge between the colonial bureaucracy and 
the Indian society. His position combined the roles of 
administrator, policeman, and judge. Furthermore, the 
Spaniards regarded some of the Indian nobility as senores 
naturales and therefore they became natural allies. In those 
cases, changes in the political and administrative structures 
affecting local affairs were relatively mild. 
The Spanish crown instituted a system of indirect rule 
through Indian hereditary chiefs, or caciques, who supervised 
the allocation and collection of tribute. The caciques were 
made part of the lower level of colonial administration. With 
their position and prestige, they amassed large quantities of 
land and wealth. 53 The only major protest of the formative 
era was led by Inca Manco Capac. It was a response to the 
local abuses of the corregidor, and an attempt to establish an 
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independent neo-Inca state in the remote areas of the jungle. 
The rebellion was crushed in 1572. This put an end to the 
Spanish attempt to rule through the Indian nobility but the 
caciques were permitted to maintain their privileges and 
status, including exemption from tribute. 
The Mature Colonial Era 
By the last quarter of the eighteenth century the Bourbon 
monarchy was bankrupt and unstable. To enlarge the treasury, 
the crown attempted to exact as much as possible from the sale 
of offices and from through taxation. The holders of land 
grants acquired legal title and thus transformed the 
encomienda into directly owned and controlled land, or 
hacienda. 
The population experienced a dramatic increase in 
absolute numbers of mestizos and Indians. In general, their 
degree of participation in the colonial economy exceeded the 
minimum needed to pay tribute and satisfy other taxes; 
consequently a process of differentiation began. For the 
poorer segments of the population, to avoid levies involved 
"passive resistance." Many villagers fled to the remote 
highlands or jungle, while others turned to seek protection 
from the new landowners under various kinds of informal 
patron-client agreements. The growing power of the landlord 
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made it possible to offer some Indians protection from the 
mita service, the mines, or obrajes in exchange for becoming 
a colona. In addition to the mita, the corregidor developed 
repartos de mercancias as a means of extracting surplus from 
the rural population. For the goods assigned the peasants 
could be forced to pay in currency, services, or property. 
Well over a hundred times during the years 1720 to 1790 
the Indian population, sometimes accompanied or led by 
mestizos, rose up in violent defiance of the colonial 
authorities. Two rebellions stand out for their unique impact 
on the region: the 1742 rebellion led by Atahualpa and the 
1781 uprising led by Tupac Amaru II, both mestizos. According 
to Steve Stern, the implications of the Atahualpa rebellion, 
are greater than heretofore recognized. 
it lasted, it strengthened the ties 
In the ten years that 
Atahualpa developed 
between the sierra and montana peoples and gave the rebellion 
its varied regional content. The effectiveness of the 
rebellion was attributable to the varied ethnic background of 
its participants. The success of the Adamarca invasion 
disrupted the delicate balance between the colonial power and 
the sympathizing serranos. Although the surrounding highlands 
did not become mobilized, there is evidence to suggest that 
Atahualpa's visions and exploits exerted considerable appeal, 
and that under different circumstances such sympathy might had 
led to more active support. 54 
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Although at least 66 revolts took place during the decade 
1770-1780, they fall in the general category of localized, 
reformist movements. During 1780, the waves of localized 
unrest continued, ultimately erupting in the rebellion led by 
Jose Gabriel Condorcanqui, a descendant of the Incas who 
called himself Tupac Amaru II. This is how Fredrick Pike 
describes it: 
Supported by vast Indian hordes, by many of the 
mestizos of the sierra, and in the beginning by a 
considerable number of creoles, Tupac Amaru 
uprising has been described by some as a genuine 
bid for Peruvian independence by others as a more 
limited endeavor to achieve Indian's social 
redemption within the colonial framework. 55 
The regions that joined the rebellion illustrate the 
critical role of the repartos de mercancias, as a link between 
the developing commercial bourgeoisie from Lima and the 
correqidor, of the increased tax and the commercial 
penetration. In colonial society, the Bourbon reforms 
threatened a variety of established interests and thereby 
sparked multiethnic dissidence. Yet one of the features of 
Tupac Amaru' s rebellion is that, despite widespread resentment 
of the colonial government, only some rural regions 
participated in the general insurrection. In the second half 
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of the eighteenth century, regional economic revival had 
increased the participation of the village peasants in 
commercial activities. The availability of work outside the 
community structure, specifically in mining and arrieraje, 
altered the traditional village patterns. 56 The authority of 
the caciques declined in favor of the office of alcalde, with 
a concomitantly strong effect on village culture and community 
solidarity. 57 
Changes in the economic and social structures were a 
result of changes in the system of land tenure. From 1750 on, 
the central highlands, the percentage of the land owned by 
mestizos and outsiders increased considerably. 58 This period 
marked the beginning of the expansion of the hacienda at the 
expense of the neighboring communities. 
The varied social background of the rebels and the 
militant visionary character of the movement frightened the 
entrepreneurial elite from Cuzco into an alignment with the 
colonial authorities. Tupac Amaru failed, like Atahualpa 
before him, to attract powerful caciques or to forge an 
enduring alliance between different ethnic groups. The lack 
of mobilization in the central highlands also indicates the 
extent of Spanish military build-up as a consequence of the 
1742 uprising. Yet Tupac Amaru rebellion overcame the 
localized character of the earlier peasant uprisings. The 
conspiracies in the Mantaro Valley in 1780-81 and the wave of 
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rebellions in Huarochirri in the northern highlands indicate 
the potential to spread the rebellion further, and the 
continuous state of animation that characterized the rural 
population. With the death of Tupac Amaru II, violence spread 
throughout the Andes. 
The Formative State Era 
The movement for independence in the La Plata region may 
have exacerbated an already difficult situation, in the 
southern Andean highlands, created by the threat of 
reinstitution of Indian tribute which the crown had suspended 
as a conciliatory gesture after the 1781 rebellion. 
Therefore, the 1814 rebellion represented a response to a 
local situation of abuse by Spanish administrators and little, 
direct relationship to the revolutionary philosophy voiced in 
Lima. 
Mateo Garcia Pumacahua, who emerged as the leader of the 
rebellion, carefully tried to avoid the overtones of a racial 
war, and for a brief period he formed alliances between the 
creoles, mestizos, and Indians. In the words of Jorge Basadre 
who wrote on the events of 1814, Pumacahua 
stands in contrast to Tupac Amaru ... whose movement 
was one of collective vengeance, a rebellion 
against civilization, very just perhaps in its 
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origins and motivations ... but with a regressive 
orientation. It embodied pure agrarianism and 
indigenismo. On the other hand, there is the 
integral Peruvianness of Pumacahua, the man with 
the Indian blood who did not alienate himself with 
them from the creoles but identified himself with 
them ... With close sympathy we can follow his 
uprising, desire its triumph, and lament its 
defeat, because the success of Pumacahua would have 
been the success of the fused Peru, neither 
separated from the creole as Tupac Amaru nor from 
the Indian as was the emancipation movement 
directed by Simon Bolivar. 59 
Although the rebels were defeated, sporadic guerrilla 
warfare continued throughout the period of the Wars of 
Independence. According to recent research, much of the 
support of the patriota armies against the royalists was 
extended by the mobilized peasant Indian communities. They 
supplied the revolutionary forces with food and, often, 
she! ter. A large number of the arrieros served as spies. The 
presence in the rural area of a rich and successful mestizo 
group served to mediate the cause of independence with the 
peasants, and hence to draw upon an already mobilized force. 
The independence war was fought by the masses, but the 
republic did not change their status. 
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The Indian tax was 
abolished by San Martin in 1821 and again by Bolivar in 1824, 
only to be reinstated in 1826 under the name of contribucion 
de indigenas, and coinciding with the Bolivarian laws of 1824 
and 1825 that eliminated the legal status of communal holdings 
and provided that land be divided among its members. The 
purpose behind this move was to create among the peasants a 
need for money or products that could not be fulfilled within 
the confines of the community. Thus, once in debt, the 
peasant would sell his labor "voluntarily," seek part-time 
employment elsewhere, or sell his land. In reality, the 
process of capitalist penetration created the need for more 
land and labor. Therefore, the consequence of the rise of 
capitalism was the dispossession of the peasantry and, after 
their separation from the means of production, the land, their 
employment as wage-laborers. The process of capitalist 
penetration continued with the increase in the price of 
cattle, the attempted enclosure of grazing lands, and the 
pressuring of the communal holdings. As a result of the 1825 
law, the land in reducciones was divided among family members 
and the titles held individually; consequently, communal land 
could now be bought and sold. 60 
The penetration of capitalism was not a homogeneous 
process: it varied according to local conditions and 
opportunities. Given the complexity of the Andean ecology, 
communities only a few miles apart could exhibit completely 
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different patterns of commercial penetration. Local 
governments reflected these differences. Social relations 
were generally hierarchical, and few citizens were willing to 
challenge the authority of the governing elites. 
Conflict between villages and the neighboring haciendas 
became inevitable, and by 1866 it had intensified with the 
introduction of a comprehensive package of taxes, known as 
contribucion personal, to be adjusted according to the income 
level. The enforcement of this law caused spontaneous protest 
throughout the southern highlands; it was especially violent 
in Huancane in the department of Puna. Although the 
contribucion personal was almost immediately abolished, the 
protest against president Manuel Prado escalated. The 
mobilized groups were caught between the political factions 
vying for power. In the process of maintaining order, 
violence was committed on both sides. The suspected 
rebellious communities were relocated to the montana. 
By 1867, President Prado's political situation was 
unstable. Under these new conditions, Juan Bustamante 
politician and wealthy businessman from Puna decided to use 
his influence to mobilize the masses in favor of the 
president. He urged the peasants to address a letter of 
loyalty and support to the administration. Bustamante's 
liberal, constitutionalist principles, and his strong 
Christian faith were integrated into a vision of a divine 
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order in which the president became the just king, the modern 
Manco Capac. This bore a powerful appeal in the highlands 
because it represented ·the utopian vision of redemption 
through the return of the Inca. This was not well received, 
especially considering that Bustamante was himself a mestizo. 
In 1867, Bustamante's last efforts to ensure the 
implementation of legislation favorable to the peasants 
failed, and within a week he had raised an army of over 
sixteen thousand, confirming both the strong bonds of loyalty 
he had forged in the district and the permanent state of alert 
among the communities in the sierra. He realized the need for 
a grassroots campaign of armed struggle to advance the goals 
of the peasants. Although the anti-Prado forces defeated the 
peasants, for months afterward a guerrilla campaign continued 
in spite of the military reprisals. 
The persistence of the mobilization among the peasantry 
suggests that the rural masses may have had an agenda of their 
own, quite apart from the one pursued by Bustamante. 
Throughout the highlands, for the rest of the nineteenth 
century, widespread revolts continued against the 
consolidation moves of the hacendados and the local 
authorities. The European demand for alpaca wool, the 
increasing world market for minerals, and the demand for food 
from the developing Peruvian cities increased the value of the 
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land and contributed to the establishment of a new wave of 
hacienda consolidation. 
In 1903, new peasant uprisings took place in the 
highlands 
Those of Huancane and Huanco were the most severe. 
In the latter site ... the Indians tried to revive 
the Incan Empire and separate themselves from the 
country. (Even today, the Indians call Hunacho 
"Lima Hunacho" referring to the capital of their 
would-be-empire) . 61 
The foregoing paragraph indicates that this was the same 
area that had rebelled under the leadership of Bustamante, and 
retained the devotion to the utopian vision of the lost Inca 
who would return to redeem his people. 
Between 1915 and 1925, the peasant communities in the 
sierra rebelled against the waves of land enclosures. 
Although the military violently suppressed the rebellions, 
they had a profound effect on the government in Lima. In 1920 
the newly installed Leguia administration supported by the 
Congress, promulgated a new constitution that reinstated the 
community as a legal entity. 62 
The struggle that "united" races and classes in the last 
years of the colonial rule was characterized by limited creole 
support, ambiguity about the political aims of the leaders. 
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The rebellions appeared more as strong social protests to 
bring about change within the existing colonial system rather 
than to replace it. It may also be true that the failure of 
the sustained movements in the southern region of the country 
to secure independence was the result of existing divisions 
between the races. There is no denying, of course, that 
racial issues were associated with most of these rebellions 
into the twentieth century; but it would be a simplistic to 
consider only cultural divergence as the main cause, since it 
tends to overlook the social and economic issues that divide 
ethnic groups. 
Such a conclusion would ignore the extent to which these 
uprisings were organized, collectively varied as it did their 
form. In the earlier periods some were more passive, others 
carried the implied threat of violence, and others erupted 
into actual violence. All were characterized by spontaneity, 
deliberate use of force, and local orientation, because their 
evolution was limited by the strength or weakness of 
community solidarity. John Fisher, in an analysis of the 
revolutionary movements in the late colonial period, suggests 
One of the most significant themes to emerge in the 
work of the Peruvian historians in the last decades 
is the insistence that the late colonial period 
witnessed not an intensification of the 
conservatism and lethargy associated with the 
47 
Viceroyalty of Peru, but a growing tide of 
revolutionary activity, supported by Peruvians of 
all races, in pursuit of the goal of national 
independence . 63 
Furthermore, he suggests that the importance of southern 
regionalism as a force "which united whites, Indians and 
mestizos in Cuzco" has been overlooked. It is apparent, 
according to Fisher, that the principal motives behind the 
dissatisfaction in southern Peru was Cuzco creoles' lack of 
effective economic and political power. It is of great 
importance that, between 1808 and 1811, the creoles from Lima 
remained quiescent while the creoles in the southern regions 
produced several movements of noticeable effect. The southern 
creoles were generally closer to the peasants both physically 
and socially, and nursed the same desire of restoring Cuzco to 
its former importance. 
The romanticization of the Inca past was common to most 
southern mobilizations. Most far-reaching revolutionary goals 
in the peasant societies carry a religious charter that lies 
in millennia! expectations. These expectations involve a 
belief in the imminence of a new order in which existing 
inequalities will be abolished. The religion and culture of 
peasants are syncretized local variants of larger system of 
thought and doctrine, and they contain the seed of an 
alternative universe. In a precapitalist society, where the 
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link between the secular and the sacred has not been severed, 
this is one of the forms the revolutionary politics will take. 
Because of the significance attached to Cuzco by the creoles 
as a religious symbol in the millennia! tradition, it might be 
probable that the creoles "used" the peasants for their own 
purposes and in the process the "new" elites affected the 
future direction of the peasant mobilization. 
In the twentieth century, the goals of the protesters 
have diversified, but ultimately they have had something to do 
with land. Modernization produces changes that affect 
previous relations, and new actors may come to dominate the 
rural scene. As a result, the state may become increasingly 
hesitant to commit itself to support its former ally, the 
aristocracy, and therefore, 
Peasant movements are more likely to occur in 
societies where traditional elites lost ground 
relative to newer elites through objective economic 
changes in the importance and structure of 
agriculture or objective political changes such as 
war. 64 
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Part Two 
La Convencion Valley 
Only in 1788, close to fifty years after the 
movement (Atahualpa' s rebellion) began, did the 
first tentative exploration penetrate into 
Chancamayo. For eighty years after that, all 
jungle outposts would be heavily fortified and 
militarized. 65 
Area Description 
The valley of La Convencion is situated south of 
Chancamayo, 90 miles northwest of the city of Cuzco in the 
southern region of Peru. 66 It extends 6 0 miles along the 
Urubamba river, beginning at its junction with the Aobamba and 
ending where it flows into the Apurimac. The territory 
belongs to a large zone of underdeveloped land on the eastern 
slopes of the Andes, and it ranges in altitude from 17,000 
feet to about 1,600 feet. The terrain is highly irregular, 
with 82 percent of the land located on hillsides of 55 or more 
degrees angle; approximately 91. 82 percent of the total 
surface, that is, 3,394,948.08 hectares is unavailable for 
agriculture67 and that reduces the total cultivatable area to 
only 8.18 percent or 302,446.92 hectares. 68 
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The valley is quite narrow. The river forms several 
pockets where it widens to nearly a mile in width, and steep 
slopes drop down from the mountains. The geographical area 
involved in the peasant movement was approximately 17,650 
square miles. It was settled in the late eighteenth century 
and cultivated mainly for cash crops. 69 Relatively little is 
known of the pre-colonial settlements in the valley, although 
it is generally believed that Incas secured coca leaf from 
this area. The proximity to the Inca ruins of Machu Pichu 
also lends credibility to the idea of early Incan agriculture 
in the valley. 
At the time of the conquest, the Machiguengas inhabited 
part of the valley. They occupied the lower end of the 
valley, near the present-day community of Quellouno. The 
earliest record of Spanish presence in the valley dates to 
1541, when the area of the Huiro hacienda was granted by royal 
decree to the wife of the corregidor of the audiencia of 
Cuzco. The valley also served as an escape route for Inca 
Manco Capac and his followers as they fled from Cuzco to the 
remote area of Villcabamba. 70 The defeat of Tupac Amaru I in 
1572 signaled the complete submission of the Inca empire, and 
the Machiguenga tribe moved further upstream. 71 
From 1541 to the 1650 encomiendas were granted to the 
family members and friends of the conquistadores, religious 
orders, and few members of the Inca nobility, 72 but the 
51 
isolation that followed was a consequence of uprisings in the 
surrounding highlands. The outcome of Atahualpa' s rebellion, 
in addition to driving missionaries and merchants out of the 
montana, kept the area from further exploration for more than 
80 years. Hence, the valley did not develop for quite a 
while, it remained geographically inaccessible and the Spanish 
lacked interest in further colonization. The valley had no 
underground wealth, but a warm and humid climate allowed the 
cultivation of sugar cane and other products which were 
required with the opening of the highland mining economy. It 
was not until the end of the nineteenth century, however, that 
the sierra's mineral wealth began to be exploited. 
In the late eighteenth century, the encomiendas evolved 
into haciendas, which became the traditional agrarian 
institution in the sierra. Although, the 1852 Civil Code, 
defined the status of the Indian as a Peruvian citizen with 
the same legal rights as other Peruvians and presumed that 
Indians could act in their own self interest 
immediately following the promulgation of this code 
that the latifundian oligarchies began to be formed 
in Peru. 73 
The use of Law 1200 "on mountain lands" was instrumental in 
the formation of the latifundia, because the decree not only 
it encouraged concentration of land, it reinforced. 74 
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Over a long period of time influential people received 
title to property in the ceja de montana as payment for 
political favors. Land was also merely acquired for 
speculation, in the hope that roads or railways would be built 
and the land could be sold for profit. 75 
On a national level, the period of civilian democratic 
rule, 1894-1914 was characterized by increased dependency and 
reduced governmental capability. Foreign involvement became 
the cornerstone of Peruvian survival. Foreign military 
missions were organizing and rebuilding the Peruvian military, 
foreign business and banking were increasingly taking 
advantage of the expanding opportunities in the private 
sector. Furthermore, world prices for the export products, 
especially sugar, cotton, wool, and minerals, were relatively 
high. The prevalent neopositivist ideology, justifying 
limited expansion of the state's role in order to strengthen 
rather than restrict the private sector, and the large debt 
accrued placed constraints on development. 
Peru's external dependency increased during this period. 
The country's exports expanded fivefold between 1900 and 1919, 
and became more diversified. The configuration of foreign 
investments, likewise became diversified. New foreign 
investments in the export sector increased the price of land 
and mining concessions in the central highlands, which in turn 
caused many farmers to lose their lands and migrate to Lima or 
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newly colonized territories. The coastal agricultural lands 
were purchased by foreign interests and changed from food 
production to production of sugar and cotton. Government 
income doubled between 1900 and 1909, then fluctuated within 
a narrow range until 1919, when it doubled again in the space 
of two years. 76 But the state was unable to satisfy the 
increasing demands from a growing native entrepreneurial 
middle class and a radicalizing labor force. 
Insufficient precedent for constitutional civilian rule, 
elections that still involved only a very small portion of the 
total population, and the effects of dependency on the newly 
articulate sectors brought about the end of the "civilian 
rule. " The economic recovery under Guillermo Billinghurst and 
Manuel Pardo strengthened the power of the commercial 
bourgeoisie, to the detriment of the gamonales from the 
highlands. 77 This process continued under Leguia' s 
administration. In spite of it all, this phase witnessed the 
modern economic development of Peru, which, except for the 
mining enclaves in the central highlands, was concentrated on 
the coast. 
The highlands remained largely rural and agricultural. 
Traditionally, this rural society it was dominated by large 
haciendas whose laborers served under semi-feudal conditions. 
Power rested in the control of the land, and like in all 
agrarian societies, control over land meant power over the 
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masses. 78 At the local level, the gamonal, whose power and 
wealth was in land, controlled the appointment of local 
government officials, and could prevent the enactment or 
enforcement of government actions he opposed, thereby 
undermining national government control. The effect on the 
comunidades was devastating. Labor tribute continued to be 
extracted. 79 The communities lost much of their lands, and 
the lands that stayed under their control were often distant 
and poor in quality. In addition they had lost their legal 
right to exist as comunidades per se. 
The Leguia Legacy 
Between 1915 and 1925 the Indian comunidades of Cuzco and 
Puna rebelled many times, and the Tocroyoc rebellion 
represented the communards' response to the new wave of 
enclosures. By 1921, the Tocroyoc communards experienced some 
commercial success, in the export of wool. The community 
economy was transformed into a monetary economy and it took 
action to redress grievances such as obligatory labor duties 
in building roads and the supply of labor duty to the 
neighboring estates. The community petitioned the government 
to reclaim pasture rights lost to the estates. Furthermore, 
the communards claimed the right to hold their market, a right 
until then monopolized by the nearby market and its mestizo 
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traders. Their leader, Domingo Huarto, was himself rich in 
money and livestock, and aspired to a commercial role similar 
to positions occupied by the mestizos but in the highland 
society of the time social mobility had restrictions. He 
represents the new entrepreneurial capitalist, the cholo, 
whose development was handicapped by the presence of 
precapitalist relations. Although the revolt was violently 
suppressed, it left a definite impact on the society. Eight 
similar episodes affected the department of Cuzco. 80 
Augusto B. Leguia came to power with widespread support, 
and the Oncenio, 1919-1930, marked a major effort to modernize 
Peru through the use of further foreign investments and loans. 
Rather than build a strong political base, Leguia tried to win 
patronage by providing schools, roads, public buildings, and 
water supplies. 
The populist solution of the Leguia Oncenio was 
essentially the elite's response to the potential 
rather than actual threat of mass social 
mobilization pressures. Furthermore, this 
solution, designed as it was to protect elite 
privileges largely based on Peru's foreign trade, 
investment and loan structure, also protected and 
enhanced such external dependency relationships. 81 
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In the wake of the peasant uprisings in the southern 
highlands, new legislation was passed, first regarding the 
Indian communities and second, the Ley Vial, or Law of Road 
Conscription. These laws created conditions ripe for rural 
mobilization. The law regarding the Indian population was in 
article 58 in the 1920, and declared the Government's 
obligation to protect the indigenous communities and to 
stabilize the relationship between the peasant communities and 
the haciendas. 82 The law gave communities that had retained 
some traces of Indian culture the right to petition the 
government for official recognition as an indigenous 
communities. Such recognition re-established the principle of 
inalienable lands for members of community. It re-established 
the community as a "judicial entity," giving it certain rights 
in the legal system not otherwise accorded to villages. Most 
important, in cases of disputes with neighboring villages or 
large landowners, the community gained the right to appeal 
directly to the government's Division of Indian Affairs in 
Lima. 
The law provided the peasant communities with an 
important weapon for holding back further encroachments by 
large landowners. Although the effects were primarily 
defensive, the law provided a base from which the campesinos 
from the altiplano were able to take offensive in a period of 
concentration of land ownership. In order to take that legal 
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offensive, villages had to be recognized and inscribed by the 
government. In 1926 the Ministry of Labor recognized the 
first 59 communities in the nation, yet by mid-1960s less that 
one-half of the communities have been inscribed: 1,400 out of 
about 4 , 0 0 0 . 83 • 
There is justification for this lack of interest. 
Unfamiliarity with and the cost of legal procedures was a 
deterrent. After centuries of repression, the peasants did 
not trust the government and feared that recognition might be 
another way to be robbed of their land. And finally, it soon 
became evident that community land could not be favorably used 
to obtain credit. 84 The most important law subsequent to the 
1920 constitution was the Peruvian Indigenous Community 
Statute, which reaffirmed the prohibition against the sale of 
village lands to non-comuneros and offered the community some 
protection against the usurpation of its lands. 
To modernize the country, Leguia's Ley Vial provided for 
the building of the roads that would connect the coast with 
the highlands. Peasants along the routes were required to 
provide labor in constructing roads and buildings for the 
local authorities. 85 While this law was resented, the 
opening of the countryside provided contact with other 
villages, an essential ingredient for rural mobilization. In 
La Convencion Valley, the construction of the road and the 
railroad provided direct contact with the outside world, and 
58 
stimulated internal growth, that is, the development of 
several small settlements along the construction sites. The 
laborers set up temporary campsites along the projected 
routes. In time, these campsites became more permanent nuclei 
of population when the temporary buildings were yielding to 
permanent adobe structures. 86 Hacendados on whose estates 
these buildings were located charged a rental fee, the 
sigiaje, for the right to occupy the land. No purchases of 
land were involved, however, and all land was owned by the 
hacendados. In this fashion, the communities of Santa Teresa, 
Santa Maria, Chaullay, Huadquina, and Maranura emerged, as 
small commercial centers. In 1928 the railroad arrived to 
Machu Picchu, and in 1933 an extension road reached 
Quillabamba. 87 
Popular mobilization in Peru began with the labor 
movements on the coast and continued with labor struggle in 
the textile mills which climaxed with the passage of the 
eight-hour-day law. Well into the twentieth century, only a 
small percentage of Peru's population was politically 
active,and the vote was limited to literate citizens who owned 
property. 88 It was during the labor struggle of the 1920, 
that Victor Raul Haya de la Torre first became prominent. He 
asserted that the Peruvian working class, whether rural or 
urban, lacked the class consciousness and experience needed to 
qualify for leadership; therefore he assigned this role to the 
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middle-class. Although indigenismo was a major plank in the 
early platform of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria 
Americana, the party's main concern remained Peru's middle 
sector: artisans, small landowners, professionals, and small 
capitalists, whose opportunities for economic development were 
constrained by the growing concentration of economic power 
with the foreign investors. 89 
The APRA advocated a powerful state that would guarantee 
to every citizen life, health, education, and moral well-being 
and to which individuals would be subordinated. From the 
beginning aprismo emphasized the plight of the middle sector. 
Although this was not new in the Peruvian ideology, at the 
time, under the Leguia regime, the middle sector was gaining 
numerically, politically and socially. Consequently, the 
middle class did not respond to the APRA's call to lead the 
proletariat in a revolution. 
APRA's preoccupation with Peru's middle sector explains 
why Leguia became set on the party's eradication while he was 
relatively tolerant of Peruvian Communists. Despite -or 
precisely because of- the vagueness of its ideology, APRA 
managed to win over groups of urban workers and students whom 
it organized into unions that were its political base. 
According to Haya de la Torre, the developed countries were 
able to avoid violence in their internal development because 
of continuing integral evolution. In Peru, such evolution did 
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not occur, and remnants of feudalism still existed alongside 
weak capitalist structures. Therefore, violence might be 
inevitable. In the national elections of 1931, the apristas 
refused to accept the results. In the process, an aprista 
shot president Luis Sanchez Cerro, and the violence that 
ensued, created a vendetta atmosphere between the Army and 
APRA that explains the armed forces' stubborn resistance to 
APRA's assumption of power and APRA's unwillingness to share 
the power. 
The Communist party began to make inroads into the 
countryside in an effort to gain the support of the rural 
peasantry. Throughout the 1930s, the Communists in Peru 
called for the Indian communities to exercise their right to 
seize all privately held land that once belonged to them, as 
well the Indian right to govern themselves in Quechua and 
Aymara republics. 90 The Peruvian Communist party was 
basically a reformist party. This was in line with Jose 
Carlos Mariategui's conviction that Communism in Peru should 
identify with the cause of the indigenous community. 
Rural Population 
For most of its history, La Convencion Valley has been 
underpopulated in relation to its economic potential. 
Migration into the valley began in the early twentieth 
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century, but epidemics in the late nineteenth century and in 
1932-35 killed thousands of people, with serious consequences 
for the development of the area. According to one source, it 
was estimated that eight to ten thousand people died of 
malaria and others fled the valley causing an acute shortage 
of labor. 91 
When the dangers of malaria were eliminated in the 1940s, 
the peasants from the sierra once again became interested in 
opportunities in the valley. The availability of land brought 
in a large number of migrants from the neighboring highlands, 
as evidenced by the increase in population from 27,243 in 1940 
to 61,901 in the 1960 census. 92 Data from the first complete 
survey, in 1964, indicate that less than one-third of the 
campesinos living in the valley were born there, and that the 
average number of years in the valley for the arrendire was 28 
and for the allegado20. Most of the migrants were born in the 
surrounding sierra provinces of Urubamba, Calca, Anta, 
Acomayo, and Apurimac, which were part of the region known as 
the Mancha India. Wesley Craig's study, found no evidence 
that any single province served as a source of migrant labor. 
Hacienda Huayopata Chote has secured its labor from 
the Provinces of Canchis and Acomayo in the 
Department of Cuzco, the Potrero Hacienda has 
relied principally on migrants from the Department 
of Apurimac, with secondary sources being the 
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provinces of Urubamba, Cuzco, Paruro and Anta in 
the Department of Cuzco. Sahuayaco shows heavy 
migration from Urubamba, Paucartambo, and Calca in 
the Department of Cuzco. 93 
According to Craig, the variations in the migration 
pattern might be the result of a particular engachador 
soliciting in the home areas of the migrants, and the 
already-settled migrants encouraging or contracting family or 
community members to come to the same hacienda. In the 1940s 
and 1950s, the influx of people to the valley continued. The 
increased migration of the campesinos, was given impetus by 
the rise in the world market price of coffee and severe 
drought on the altiplano. 94 The international coffee boom of 
the 1950s period, referred to as the fiebre del cafe, had a 
profound impact on the local patterns of land tenure and rural 
society. 95 Land was claimed by members of highland elites 
and highland peasants, and competition for access to good land 
near transportation became acute. Generally, it created a 
rush to clear and plant more land in coffee. Thus cash crops 
almost entirely replaced subsistence farming, with emphasis on 
export agricultural economy. 
A simplistic analysis of the rural class structure in 
commercialized agriculture would consider a differentiation 
based on legal privileges, ethnicity, and technological 
sophistication, level of political activity and 
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organization. 96 Based on this framework, rural class systems 
diverge to the extent to which classes are set apart by legal 
privileges into landlords and peasants. The selection of 
these criteria will not suffice to describe certain 
qualitative aspects of the rural stratification in La 
Convencion at the time of mobilization, or the social changes 
the rural society assumed. Therefore, we must ponder the 
following issues: the relations with the means of production, 
the nature of the relations of production, and the mode of 
appropriation of surplus within the development of the 
capitalist agriculture. 
Within a historically defined social formation, the 
social classes exist in permanent opposition: the exploiters 
and the exploited; those who own the means of production and 
those who do not; the group that appropriates the surplus and 
the group from whom the surplus is appropriated. In a rural 
society, the classes have to be defined by their relationship 
to the land, the means of production. This criterion in 
general determines ownership, nonownership or the degree of 
possession of the land. In a rural society like La 
Convencion, the use of this standard to set the classes apart 
will determine the social stratification between the owners of 
the means of production (the hacendados), the individuals in 
possession of the means of production (the arrendires, 
allegados, and sub-allegados) , and the agricultural workers or 
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wage-laborers. This is not satisfactory, since it does not 
explain the complexity of the rural society. Therefore, the 
social organization of the labor, that is, the relations of 
production as people established them among themselves during 
the process of production is an essential factor in the 
analysis of the rural society. 
At the top of the structure in La Convencion Valley were 
the hacendados, with land very unequally divided among them. 
The landowners had been consolidating their power at national 
and regional levels since the late nineteenth century. On the 
hacienda, the land was worked by the arrendires, or 
agricultural workers. The arrendires, allegados, and 
sub-allegados possessed the means of production, and they had 
to perform labor for the landlord, in exchange for the use of 
the land. Nevertheless, the arrendires, represented the 
highest social category, from among the campesinos, because 
they used the labor services of the allegados and 
sub-allegados; and some of them may even have used wage-
laborers. 
To distinguish even further between the peasant who 
produces for the market and the one who does or not, we must 
look at the nature of accumulation of surplus. The 
accumulation of surplus may take the form of labor, of money 
or product. The hacendado may accumulate surplus based on 
labor and money. The arrendires, who possessed their parcela, 
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appropriated surplus value depending on whether they had freed 
themselves of the labor service requirement by employing 
allegados. The appropriation and accumulation of capital 
thereby would be the result of labor service and of commercial 
activities. 
The surplus originated from the labor service performed 
by the allegados, sub-allegados, and agricultural workers. 
Some of the arrendires, with smaller plots of land, continued 
to fulfill the labor-service demands; and in this case the 
hacendado appropriated the surplus generated. In the case of 
the allegados, if an allegado could subcontract to a 
sub-allegado, then the surplus was based only on the 
sub-allegado's work on the allegado's plot, because most 
allegados could not afford to employ wage labor. For the 
sub-allegado, who performed the labor service, his surplus 
labor was appropriated by the hacendado on the one hand or the 
arrendire, on the other. Sub-allegados possessed a small 
piece of land, but generally they were laborers. They 
transferred the surplus value to the hacendado, the arrendire, 
and the allegado. As for the segment of the permanent 
agricultural workers or tiapacoc, they sold their labor to the 
hacendado or arrendire for wages, similar to the seasonal 
agricultural worker or habilidado. The seasonal workers, 
might or might not own land in their community of origin. The 
final rung on the ladder was occupied by the rural merchant, 
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who owned a factor of production that is, capital -and 
represented the new element in the rural setting. 
Although the original separation in the Andean society 
was along racial lines, stratification in the twentieth 
century was on lines of economic social, and cultural 
differences. In the Cuzco area, class lines were maintained;, 
at the top there were the mestizos, who were hacendados, 
business and professional men, or government employees who 
controlled the machinery of administration in the rural areas. 
At the bottom were the Indians, the colonos on the estates, 
small farmers in communi ties, and unskilled laborers. In 
between the two extremes there was an economically and 
culturally important segment known as cholos, people who had 
ceased being Indians and aspired to gain the status of 
mestizos. Generally they had some schooling and were 
bilingual. They worked as small shopkeepers, or artisans, or 
farmed small to moderate-sized farms. Usually, if they held 
political offices in the community, their position would be at 
the bottom. In the 1930s and early 1940s, if a cholo segment 
was present, it was still minor and politically unimportant. 
After the mid-1940s, with the introduction of coffee, changes 
in transportation, and the development of provincial centers, 
this group gathered strength. Anibal Quijano suggested, 
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these partially acculturated men (called cholos) 
were decisive actors in the political mobilization 
of Quechua communities in the Mancha India. 
Undoubtedly, village officials -the personero and 
the members of the junta communal- influenced their 
community's political behavior. They would be 
carefully listened to before the comuneros 
undertook a land invasion or joined a regional 
peasant federation. In short, the political 
orientations of the village's elite may well have 
been an independent determinant. 97 
No available information for La Convencion, however, reveals 
the way the whole peasant group was structured in relation to 
the ethnic distinction of the society. There are references 
to mestizos, Indians, and cholos in the writings of Wesley 
Craig, E. J. E. Hobsbawm, William Foote Whyte, and Giorgio 
Alberti; however, but clear ethnic implications lack clarity. 
It appears that in the process of leaving their native places, 
the migrating peasants adopted new social status; and the 
ensuing conflict between the hacendado and his tenants could 
have been partly based on the incongruity between the 
peasants' own view of themselves and the patron's idea. Yet 
it is impossible to deny that the core of the conflict was the 
contradiction between the customary structure of the tenure 
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labor service that the landlord tried to uphold and the 
entrepreneurial freedom that the market economy required. 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, poor agricultural 
performance generated economic and social pressures. The 
government's underlying problem was also one of the growing 
urban population, with rising living standards that could kept 
under control only with a change in accomplishments of the 
agricultural sector or if export performances remained strong 
enough to maintain the import of food supplies. Apart from 
the issue of food supply, the lagging performance of the 
agriculture would affect the supply of economic surplus for 
the rest of the economy. Past flexibility of the Peruvian 
economy had enabled successive governments to ignore the needs 
of the agricultural sector, despite willingness to consider an 
agrarian reform, failed to promote rural development and in 
some way it obstructed it. In 1956, the election of Manuel 
Prado as president marked the beginning of la convivencia, the 
"coexistence" of the once-radical APRA leaders and the 
conservatives, led by a traditional oligarchy. APRA did not 
hold any cabinet posts, but the party was legal, it won 
freedom for union activities and it received promises of 
support for the candidacy, of Raul Haya de la Torre in the 
following elections. President Prado appointed a commission, 
headed by Pedro Beltran, a leading conservative landowner, to 
study the question of agrarian reform. The commission was set 
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up not in response to the peasants' request but as a response 
to the rapidly deteriorating national economic conditions and 
the high rate of rural migration to the cities. After 
deliberating for a few years, the commission produced two 
reports advocating, respectively, improvements in urban 
housing to accommodate migrants from the rural areas, and 
colonization of virgin lands east of the Andes as a long-term 
solution to the overpopulation of the highlands. The issue of 
agrarian reform, in the commission's view, should be avoided, 
and only the most inefficiently used large haciendas should be 
considered for expropriation with full compensation to the 
owners. 
It would be easy to reject the Beltran commission as mere 
ploy, but its significance lies in the fact that it existed to 
pay lip-service to the idea of reform. It reflected changing 
political reality, a new consensus. The landlords in the 
traditional sector were becoming less powerful in national 
politics, while other contingents were becoming stronger and 
more organized. 98 The Prado administration's policy on rural 
mobilization fluctuated between lack of understanding of the 
tenants in La Convencion Valley and repression of the 
comuneros in Pasco. 99 Why the difference in the action taken 
against the peasants between one area and the other? It is 
generally believed that the Prado administration could have 
crushed militarily the movement in La Convencion, but decided 
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it was not worth the expense. In La Convencion, many of the 
hacendados were old men or widows, managing the estates with 
little or no political influence; they therefore could not ask 
for extra government protection. Many of the properties were 
leased out or handled by administrators. Furthermore, the 
commission charged by the Prado government with investigating 
the situation in the valley favored change in land 
distribution. Finally, geographically in the valley of La 
Convencion, the mobilization could be confined to the isolated 
jungle area the government was less concerned about the threat 
it created the rest of the country. 
In comparison, in the case of the Pasco comuneros in 
1961, the powerful corporations that owned the latifundios of 
Pasco were able to demand strong government support peasant 
against land invasions. These events and the subsequent 
encounter with the military brought the land seizures to a 
halt. 100 The Prado administration initiated a program called 
operacion desolajdo (operation eviction) as a coordinated 
military effort aimed at ousting peasants from the haciendas 
which were invaded by the comuneros, in November and December 
of 1960. The following March, several comuneros were killed, 
and thousands of others were removed, at the cost of some 
lives; but the offenders were stopped. 
In 1962, in response to increasing radicalization of 
workers and peasants in many parts of the country as well as 
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uncertain national elections, 
power. It reacted promptly 
the Peruvian military took 
to the rural situation by 
instituting a limited land reform that granted coffee 
producers title to their plots without redistributing the land 
of the other haciendas . 101 
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The Land 
CHAPTER THREE 
Part One 
The Hacienda System 
In the tradi tiona! rural economy, land is the main source 
of wealth. And income from land cannot be realized without 
labor. The land-tenure institutions in Peru were a product of 
the Spanish colonial system, which once established, served to 
perpetuate the traditional social structure. Ownership or 
control of the land in traditional agrarian systems carries 
with it political power: large landowner can make others do 
things for them, if necessary by force. The concentration of 
property in the hands of the few lies at the heart of the 
peasant problem in Peru. The same, relatively few people, 
have controlled the distribution of two resources, land and 
water. 
Before the conquest, the highlands were inhabited by a 
dense agricultural population living in permanent communities. 
After the conquest, the mass of Indians was transformed into 
a peasantry, and the Spanish domination depended on their 
passive acceptance of the new order. The Spaniards assumed, 
in the beginning, that the land would remain largely in Indian 
ownership and they would be receivers of tribute. With the 
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collapse of the encomienda system, the inadequacy of the 
tribute system combined with the demographic decline, and the 
Spanish colonizers began to take over land to develop new 
agricultural enterprises to support themselves. 102 
Once the ties with Spain were severed, the legal devices 
that until that time had granted a measure of protection to 
the Indian communities disappeared, and a period of land 
grabbing began that lead to the consolidation of the hacienda. 
Land became a commodity, and the best Indian lands were taken 
over by the large landlords or by the upward-moving 
"marginals . "103 
Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz define the hacienda 
an agricultural estate, operated by a dominant 
owner ... and a dependent labor force, organized to 
supply a small-scale market by means of scarce 
capital, in which the factors of production are 
employed not only for capital accumulation but also 
to support the status aspirations of the owner. 104 
In Peru, the development of the hacienda system is 
characteristic of those regions where the presence of dense 
indigenous population encouraged early reliance on the 
encomienda system, and where the failure of the encomienda 
system was counteracted by the rise of the regional market 
economy depending on mining. The haciendas relied on a 
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limited supply of local capital, which, in most cases, came 
from the church, interested in the purchase of fixed rents as 
a form of investment, local merchant groups, or small banks. 
The limited capital available was reflected in the level of 
technology, which requires small outlay of capital. The 
haciendas needed only enough capital to maintain themselves in 
a state of stability; they rarely expanded production, and 
they supplied a restricted market. 
The most typical form of ownership of such estates was 
familial. Family ownership permitted the mobilization of 
wealth through kinship ties and personal contact. Thus, the 
traditional hacienda was basically two things: an estate that 
belonged to a recognized member of the privileged class, and 
a source of income to support the conspicuous consumption that 
demonstrated aristocratic status. Power and prestige as part 
of the status, were important components when lacking 
sufficient capital the hacendado, had to find capital and 
other means to assure his labor force. 
As the value of the land gradually rose, the hacendado 
had powerful justification to hold onto it, even periods he 
did not want to cultivate. Doing so it avoided competition, 
and the monopolization of land helped to alleviate the labor 
problem. Therefore, the hacendado needed the excess land, 
less for agricultural purpose, than to deprive its laborers of 
potential alternatives to participation in hacienda process. 
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The hacienda also, had control over enough land to grow its 
cash produce and to provide its workers with subsistence 
plots, and benefits. Such benefits were important for the 
relationship that existed on the hacienda, and, in most cases 
they took the place of wages. Very often, 
a large hacienda or a group of haciendas will be 
surrounded by marginal land which they dominate 
indirectly rather than directly through control of 
the legal title. The inhabitants of these marginal 
zones will depend on the hacienda for cash wages 
and other perquisites, but often retain traditional 
cultural patterns in managing their own internal 
affairs . 105 
Since it lacked capital, the hacienda had to rely on cheap 
labor and on different devices to maintain it. 
The province of La Convencion existed as an independent 
administrative unit until 1857. The origin of the hacienda 
system in the province dates to the seventeenth century. The 
first land grants were given as early as 1541. 106 From 1650 
to 1669, in the lower part of the valley, seventeen haciendas 
emerged in a zone dedicated to the cultivation of coca. 
Between 1720 and 1820, five new titles were issued and many 
existing haciendas changed ownership. In 1767, when Carlos 
III expelled the Jesuit order from the colonies, land in the 
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valley that belonged to them became state property and later 
was sold. After the Wars of Independence, the government 
continued to issue titles to land in the valley in exchange 
for favors, to public officials and to military personnel who 
distinguished themselves on the field. 
By 1880, all the land of the valley was in the hands of 
the hacendados . There were no small tenant farmers, there 
were no independent peasant communities, and no peasant owned 
land. The hacienda remained as the essential system of land 
tenure the valley until the 1890s . 107 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
hold of the hacienda system was so strong that it withstood 
attempts by the Peruvian government to create independent 
communities by fiat. In 1887, a presidential decree ordered 
that areas be set aside within the various districts in the 
valley for district capitals. The hacendados were assured of 
financial reimbursement from the special tax levied on the 
production of coca. In 1893, another law demanded that 
boundaries be established, land bought, and district capitals 
be founded with the tax revenue from the coca leaf production. 
And again in 1902, a new tax of ten centavos on each 11.5 
kilograms of cacao was mandated to be used for the 
expropriation of lands for the founding of district capitals. 
Until the 1890s, when the government constructed a 
mule-path at the request of the landowners, La Convencion, was 
77 
isolated from the rest of Peru. The power of the hacendados, 
although challenged by the presidential decrees, remained a 
united front. 
The first split among the hacendados occurred in 1881, 
when one of the smaller landowners, Don Pio Concha donated 
one-third of his estate for the creation of an independent 
town that became the provincial capital of Quillabamba. This 
move was of great consequence for the development of the area: 
it set the stage for the emergence of a market center within 
the hacienda system. Until then, the hacendado dealt directly 
with Cuzco for supplies, labor contracting, and market. The 
peasant, whether a peon on the hacienda or a tenant farmer, 
received from the individual hacendado all the services he 
needed. Although it should be noted that as early as 1881 
some merchants were living in the valley, they contracted 
exclusively with the hacendados, and another fifty years 
passed before additional communities began to develop 
independently of the haciendas. 
The hacienda, in the valley, was composed of two 
structurally complementary sectors of production: the mejoras 
hacienda, or the demesne area, which covered the most fertile 
irrigated land in the valley and was farmed by tenants on 
behalf of the landlord; and the arriendos, or the non-demesne 
area, on which the individual tenant plots were located. In 
exchange for the use of land, the arrendires entered into a 
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fixed-term contract with the hacendado. This system was a 
reminder of the feudal institution of seigneurie. 
The land of a seigneurie is divided into two parts, 
each quite distinct but linked to the other by very 
close ties of interdependence. On one hand we have 
what amounts to a large home farm cultivated under 
the direction of the lord or his agents; ... which 
in French became domaine (and the in English is 
usually rendered demesne) . On the other, we have a 
number of small or middle-sized holdings whose 
tenants owed the lord various customary dues and, 
still more important, helped in the cultivation of 
his demesne. Historians describe these holdings as 
'tenures', a word from the legal vocabulary of the 
later Middle Ages. From the economic point of view 
this combination of large and small farming within 
a single unit is the essential characteristic of 
the seigneurie. 108 
The similarities end here. While the feudal manor was a 
self-sustaining unit that had little commerce with the outside 
world, the haciendas in La Convencion were primarily economic 
enterprises that provided crop, sold on the market. The land 
was worked through serf-like labor service, while for the 
hacienda different types of labor contracting were available. 
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In medieval Europe, the lord of the manor owed allegiance to 
higher-ranking individuals. In La Convencion, important 
landlords, or gamonales, had almost absolute power within their 
lands and owed allegiance to no one. 
In La Convencion the hillsides, the non-demesne part of 
the hacienda, where the tenant farmers' plots were located, 
were climatically better suited to coffee raising than the 
lands used by the landlords, located on the valley floor. 
Most of the demesne was planted with cacao, sugar cane, and 
tea, and landlords were disinclined to shift to new crops. 
Since colonial times the haciendas in La Convencion had 
produced coca and aguardiente, both products in demand at the 
mining centers at Potosi, Oruro and Huancavelica. The coca 
haciendas were involved in capitalist agriculture, since they 
were tied to the market. The use of slave labor gives an 
indication of the owners' economic interest in maximizing the 
use of the fertile land in the valley. Cocoa, introduced at 
the time of the independence wars or shortly thereafter, was 
produced for the manufacture of the chocolate in Cuzco. 109 
But the most important of the cash crops, grown under the 
permanent cultivation system became the ,coffee. Coffee was 
introduced, first in Dutch Guiana (Suriname), and it spread to 
Central America sometime between 1791 and 1808. Regarded as 
a needed export crop on which to base a viable economy, it 
became firmly established in the 1830s . 110 
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In Peru, 
sometimes in 
however, coffee 
the middle of the 
and tea were introduced 
nineteenth century, and 
cultivation remained small scale and without specialization, 
as described in the following account. 
For the middle of the nineteenth century, D. Mateo 
Paz Soldan, in Geografia del Peru, Lima, 1862, on 
page 399 reports a production per annum of: 25,000 
arrobas of coca, 1,200 arrobas of aguardiente, 300 
arrobas of cocoa, 100 arrobas of coffee, 250 
arrobas of sugar. The annual Guia del Peru (1860) 
talks vaguely of cocoa, coca cotton and tobacco, 
but the 1872 edition no longer refers to these. In 
1906 Carlos B. Cisneros, Resena Economica del Peru 
(Lima, 1906), mentions only coca and aguardiente; 
in 1914 Luis Valcarcel, 'La cuestion agraria en el 
Cuzco,' Rev. Univ., III (Cuzco, 1914), speaks of 
sugar, coca, coffee, cocoa and fruit, and mentions 
experiments with rubber and makes it clear that 
aguardiente and coca were overwhelmingly 
preponderant. It is clear from Kaeger (1901), that 
coffee was not yet seriously cultivated. 111 
By 1915, the export output from some of the haciendas 
increased: 60,000 arrobas of coca, 20,000 quintals of 
aguardiente, 20,000 quintals of cocoa, 20,000 arrobas of 
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coffee. The estate owners continued to produce the staples, 
and they were involved in commerce with the major cities: 
Lima, Juliaca, Arequipa, and Cuzco. 112 
The tenants were experimenting with coffee and some 
cocoa. But the peasants realized that they could get into 
coffee production without much investment and without taking 
any land away from other crops. Coffee was not yet cultivated 
under monoculture system, instead between rows of corn or 
other traditional crops, eliminating them only when the coffee 
trees reached bearing age. The harvesting and processing of 
coffee were relatively simple, labor intensive activities. 
Thus coffee lends itself well to smallholder cultivation. It 
is a colonizer's crop because it can grow on land that is only 
partially cleared and its high unit value makes transport 
costs bearable. The expansion and consolidation of the tenant 
holdings took place in the 1930s, when malaria destroyed a 
large number of the non-demesne labor force and the subsequent 
immigrants received more favorable tenancy agreements. By the 
late 1940s, many of the valley's tenants were supplementing 
their subsistence farming with the cultivation of coffee. Of 
all major agricultural export activities, coffee was the most 
reconcilable with small-scale land ownership and cultivation, 
since it did not require large production units, or farm sizes 
or heavy investment capital. 
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The increase in the coffee production thus can be 
attributed to the tenant farmers rather than the hacendados' 
entrepreneurship. It is also directly associated with a 
corresponding rise in the world coffee prices. 113 
As the farmers were increasing coffee production, 
middlemen, or rescatistas, began to appear at the railroad 
centers, bypassing the landlords in offering credit to the 
farmers in exchange for marketing their coffee. Until then, 
the hacendado was the tenant farmer's only contact with the 
market. With the capital available to them, the tenants hoped 
to increase production but their contract with the hacendado 
proved to be in the way. Many tenant farmers decided to deal 
with the matter by hiring another peasant from the highlands 
to work for the hacendado in their place, or to work their 
land for them while they completed their obligations to the 
landlord. 
To entice a villager from the highlands to come to the 
valley, the peasant farmer, or arrendire, would offer a 
parcela of his land with similar work obligations. The 
newcomer who entered an agreement with the arrendire was 
called an allegado. Additional hierarchies and increased 
economic differentiation developed when some of the allegados, 
following the same pattern, contracted with others to be 
their tenant farmers. The latter group was known as 
sub-allegados, habilidados, agregados or manipures. 
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Although the Constitution of 1932 prohibited work 
without renumeration (Article 55), such forms of 
relationship continued in the valley as well as in 
other areas of the country. 114 
By the 1940s, the hacendados also began to switch to the 
more lucrative coffee market and started to pressure the 
tenants for more days of work during the harvesting and to 
reclaim the tenants' lands, by this time much improved 
parcels. 
A study of land distribution before the rural 
mobilization of the 1950s, shows that nine large haciendas 
occupied 57.3 percent of the total cultivable land, or 
320,417.49 hectares. Among these the hacienda Huadquina, 
which belonged to Alfredo Romainville, had a total of 152,480 
hectares. During the mobilization, this estate was the site 
of the most militant peasant movement in the entire region of 
La Convencion and Lares. Furthermore the study indicates that 
there were 66 haciendas between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares, 
representing 36.7 percent or 207,420.81 hectares. The 88 
small haciendas controlled only 5. 9 percent of the 
agricultural land, or 32,962.87 hectares. The 38 properties 
no larger than 50 hectares, occupied not more than 0 .1 percent 
of the surface or 719.46 hectares. Twenty-five of these units 
were worked by the proprietors, and twelve through 
tenancy. 115 The existing land distribution in the valley 
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indicates that the 17 6 hacendados with a total area of 
478,381.60 hectares represented about 85.5 percent of the 
total land area, with ownership of 1. 6 percent of the 
productive units, while 11,059 tenants were in possession of 
the 9 8. 2 percent of the agricultural units on an area of 
80,340.60 which represented about 14.4 percent of the 
available land. 116 
The first complete survey of the hacienda lands ever 
carried out in La Convencion Valley took place during 
1964-1965. The data still show a vast under-utilization of 
the land, that less than one hundredth of the total surface 
was under cultivation, and that the tenants were occupying 
43,553.6 hectares under intense cultivation. The tenants were 
working nearly one-fifth of the total area of the haciendas. 
When analyzing this information we must remember that by this 
time, the valley has already gone through significant change, 
and that the hacendados most likely never worked directly more 
than one-fiftieth of their total area in any event. 
Consideration must be given also to the local topographical 
conditions. 
In the late 1940s, in rural society of La Convencion (and 
Lares), the hacendados, exercised complete control over the 
lives of their 11,059 tenant farmers, and the tenancies were 
weakly established, and the tenant land was an unevenly 
distributed. Available data indicate that in certain 
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districts within the region, the average size of the tenancy 
was much higher than in others . For example, in Santa Ana the 
average size was 4.9 hectares, in Maranura 3.3 hectares, in 
Huayopata 4.7 hectares, and in Vileabamba 3.4 hectares. In 
Santa Teresa the average tenancy was 17.5 hectares, in Lares 
8.0 hectares, in Occobamba 10.7 hectares, in Echarate 10.2 
hectares and in Huadquina the average area possessed by the 
tenant farmers was 17.2 hectares. This data would indicate 
that the arrendire group with an average tenancy of 5. 0 
hectares per tenant farmer should had been more mobilized 
against the hacienda system than the arrendires that 
controlled plots of an average size of 17.2 hectares. 
Nevertheless, the tenant farmers in the districts where 
they possessed most of the land on average became more 
radicalized and their haciendas became the loci of the 
mobilizing activity. An explanation would be that the peasant 
mobilization in the district of Santa Ana, Maranura and 
Huayopata, took place under the auspices of the Communist 
party's reformist movement. The peasant activities in the 
districts of Santa Teresa, Lares were directed by Hugo Blanco 
and carried the imprint of the radicalism expressed by his 
Trotskyite faction. In short, Hugo Blanco's "Trotskyism" 
enabled the arrendires, simultaneously engaged in a twofold 
conflict, against the allegados and sub-allegados as well as 
the hacendados, to operate successfully on two fronts. By 
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suppressing reference to the socio-economic differentiation 
arising from the capitalist development within the 
tenant-farmers group it permitted them to challenge the 
landlord class from within a heterogeneous anti-landlord 
front. Moreover, by expropriating the landlord class in the 
course of "dual power" it enabled the arrendires to reproduce 
and reinforce the politico-ideological images of 
egalitarianism with the alleqados and sub-alleqados. 117 
The district of Echarate was originally under the 
apristas' influence and later fell under the control of the 
Communist Party. It seems 
precisely the peasants who 
inconsistent that it would be 
possessed the most land who 
composed the core of the most militant group, as an integral 
part of the general mobilization. Therefore, we must direct 
our attention to other interceding factors such as local 
political party ideology, party organization, and the existing 
patron-client relations on the respective haciendas. 
The Labor 
In the valley of La Convencion, the encomienda was not 
feasible, since the zone was practically unpopulated. Most of 
the members of the Indian tribes, from the higher elevations 
fled north to escape the work demands of the settlers; few 
were converted to slaves and put to work on the coca 
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estates. 118 The alternative source of labor was slaves from 
Africa. In the seventeenth century, the colonizers did use 
African slaves for a very limited period. The presence of 
relations of production based on slave labor, however, does 
not mean that the colonial economy was based on a primitive 
mode of production first, and then followed by a feudal mode 
of production. Instead, at that point of colonial development 
wage labor was unthinkable, since it meant the separation of 
the Indians from their means of production, the land -a 
development that historically had not yet occur. The presence 
of precapitalist relations of production within an economic 
system directed to produce for the market does not determine 
the nature of the mode of production. 
As the hacienda became the valley's dominant institution, 
it was still difficult to exploit the land because of the 
scarcity of labor. The hacendados used engachadores, or 
agents, to contract wage laborers. Some of these agents were 
relatives or friends of the hacendados in the highlands, who 
helped with seasonal recruitment; others were professionals 
with contacts in various sierra communities. The recruiting 
was done during the Sunday market, which the engachadores 
found most favorable. This would often be the day the 
peasants were off from work and in need of cash. Once 
drafted, the peons had to sign a contract indicating the sum 
they received; then, the agent would give them a papelera, or 
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receipt, showing the same amount. Usually, the peons would 
make their own way to the plantation. 119 The labor was 
obtained from the "free" minifundia population as well as from 
the ranks of the "tied" hacienda peons. Another variant of 
the system of engache involved the forwarding of advance money 
to the relative of the recruited individual. Clearly, such 
additional cash advances would bind the person over a longer 
period of employment. In any case, the element of coercion 
was present. Although there was a wage-labor market, many of 
the recruited individuals were also owners of land; that is, 
the means of production. 
The form of engache used in La Convencion differed from 
the classic form of labor recruiting used on the coast or the 
mining center in the central highlands . To co-opt the Indians 
to descend from the sierra, they were promised small plots of 
land (parcelas) on the hacienda, generally on the hillside in 
exchange for labor obligations to the hacendados. The length 
of the tenancy varied, but it was a fixed-term contract. In 
general, the lease seems to have been mainly between nine and 
ten years, which was needed if the tenant wanted to cultivate 
coffee, cacao, or tea. Tenancies that were paid for in labor 
services were a common occurrence in Peru, and they are called 
pongaje. In La Convencion valley, this term was not used 
instead, labor tenants were known as arrendires, and their 
tenancy as arriendo, which Hobsbaw.m indicated 
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may suggest that serfdom in the province is not so 
much the child of a feudal tradition as the 
response by powerful landlords to an economic 
situation. 120 
The tenant had the obligation of working a certain 
number of days on the demesne, only part of what was known as 
condiciones; the payment for the land known as canon was 
required also. The condiciones varied according to each 
estate and the availability of the labor force, a point which 
I will discuss later. 
Generally, the engache method of labor recruitment could 
be very costly because of the high rate of labor turnover. 
Therefore it tied up a significant volume of working capital 
in recruiting, with the risk of losing it to the recruiting 
agents . 121 In La Convencion, there was much less expense 
involved; the tenants received the use of unused land and at 
their own expense improved it. Moreover, by the late 1930s 
with the increased migration into the valley, the hacendados 
no longer required the services of the engachadores. 
In addition to the forms of securing labor described, 
Wesley Craig remarks on the use of habilitados, 
direct contractual labor (these workers are called 
habilitados) for restricted periods of one to three 
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months for the purposes of harvesting crops, 
planting and so forth. 122 
Eduardo Fioravanti also accounts for the presence of 
seasonal workers. He defines the habilitado as a temporary 
agricultural worker. He might be a smallholder in his 
community of origin, and sold his labor because he had to 
supplement his income. In the beginning, this system of labor 
contracting provided the necessary labor for a specific period 
of time for a stipulated wage. Because of population loss as 
a result of malaria outbreaks, the individual was often forced 
to stay on, especially if the landlord refused to pay him as 
required by the contract. Often he would be given the use of 
a parcel of land in payment for past services and future 
obligations. Hence, in practice the system of habilitado 
evolved into the pattern of engache. 123 
Finally, by the early 1950s the wage laborers, or 
tiapacoc, began to appear. This group of landless peasants 
was part of the migrant labor force that originated from the 
highlands. The labor market was thus transformed by 
population growth, proletarianization of the peasantry, and 
internal migration. 
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Patron-Client Relations 
The types of social structures found and the ways in 
which social control is distributed affect the capabilities 
and the character of states. In many respects these social 
structures derive from the unique culture, environment and 
history of each society. The social structures I am referring 
to are the patron-client systems, or clienteles, 
which consist of sets dyadic relationships linked 
together for limited purposes over periods of 
time.... A dyadic relationship in its social 
science sense is a direct relationship involving 
some form of interaction between two 
individuals . 124 
Based on this definition, a dyadic relationship can be 
voluntary or obligatory for one or both parties. It can be 
diffuse or involve clearly specified obligations for one or 
both members in the relationship; it can be of varied 
duration: a lifetime or from generation to generation and it 
can exist between persons of equal or unequal socioeconomic 
status. The most important feature is that the relationship 
must connect two individuals by a direct personal tie . 125 A 
patron-client system is made up of patron-client relationships 
that are 
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a vertical form of dyadic alliance, i.e., an 
alliance between two persons of unequal status, 
power or resources, each of whom finds it useful to 
have as an ally someone superior or inferior to 
himself. The superior member of such an alliance 
is called a patron. The inferior member is called 
a client. 126 
The patron-client relationship usually supplies benefits 
that the latter cannot obtain by himself or can obtain only on 
rare occasions. Typically, the favors the patron does for the 
client are material, while those the client does for the 
patron consists of labor and services. Furthermore, the 
guarantees the client seeks from the patron are economic 
assistance and physical protection, while the patron seeks the 
complete personal subordination of the client. Generally, 
patrons maintain alliances with more than one client. 
Therefore, it is possible to organize a large part of a 
society in clienteles, often mutually exclusive; that is, no 
client with more than one patron. Clienteles are built 
hierarchically upon each other, so that several patrons, each 
with his own clients, are in turn the clients of a higher 
patron. 
In the 
relationships 
inadequacies 
introduction, I stated 
appear as additions to 
they redress. The type 
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that patron-client 
institutions whose 
of alliances that 
developed in the southern Andean region were a result of the 
superimposition of the Spanish element on the already existing 
societal arrangements as practiced by the indigenous 
population. The impact of the European expansion was quite 
uneven. Different lines of development were established by 
the encounter between the Spaniards and the Indians . The 
conquest did not totally disrupt old forms of social 
organization and control; in fact, penetration was limited to 
certain regions until well into the nineteenth century, when 
a true worldwide economy developed. 127 
The institution of encomienda established the basis on 
which the lord-peasant relationship developed in Spanish 
America. The indigenous population in what became Peru was 
entrusted to a encomendero, and converted to a dependent labor 
force used in the mining and agriculture. His obligation to 
protect, civilize and christianize the people entrusted to 
encomendero, gave him the right to received tribute and to 
make use of their personal services which suggests a pattern 
of labor tribute as a form of serfdom. The caciques belonged 
to a culture that emphasized hierarchy and position, and 
therefore they became the natural allies of the Spaniards, 
whose rank and privileges corresponded with theirs. Within 
the colonial framework, the caciques were the vertical link 
between the state and Indian communities; they were essential 
for the flow of surplus from the communities to the state, 
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through their access to Indian labor. At this level of 
association, custom was replaced by a legal grant and the 
caciques their privileges depended upon their relationship and 
services provided to the state. At the community level, 
though, customs prevailed and became unwittingly reinforced by 
the very nature of the Spanish practices. 128 
In La Convencion, owing to the lack of 
population, the encomienda was not successful 
indigenous 
and the 
institution of cacigazco was not practiced. The consolidation 
of the rural estate system, based on feudal relations of 
production articulating an owning landlord with 
land-possessing tenants, dates from the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Between 1900 and 1940 each hacienda was a 
semi-community unto itself. In the rural setting, the patron 
status was highly correlated with land ownership and the 
client status with tenancy, dependent on the patron's land for 
survival. The peasants became directly dependent for their 
subsistence on the landlord. Here is how Sydel Silverman 
described a traditional relationship between landlord and 
peasant: 
A peasant might approach the landlord to ask a 
favor, perhaps a loan of money or help in some 
trouble with the law, or the landlord might offer 
his aid knowing there is a problem. If the favor 
was granted or accepted, further favors were likely 
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to be asked or offered at some later time. The 
peasant would reciprocate -at a time and in a 
context different from that of the acceptance of 
the favor, in order to de-emphasize the material 
self-interest of the reciprocative action- by 
bringing the landlord especially choice offerings 
from the farm produce, or by sending some member of 
the peasant family to perform services in the 
landlord's home, by refraining from cheating the 
landlord, or merely by speaking well of him in 
public and professing devotion to him. 129 
In economic terms, the tenant owed his landlord two types 
of obligations: the payment of rent, ground rent as a 
recognition of the lord's proprietary right over the soil, and 
a recompense for the tenant's enjoyment of it and the 
performance of services. In La Convencion, the 
landlord-tenant relationship took the form of labor-rent, or 
condition, whereby each tenant was obliged to supply the 
hacendado with some form of labor-service, with the 
contractually stipulated amount of days, or turno, depending 
on the requirements of the landlord, the size of the property 
to be leased and the canon, or payments. The payments usually 
were excused for the first year, or during the period of the 
rozo, clearing of the virgin land and preparation for 
cultivation. However, after cultivation was established, the 
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canon could be increased depending on the level of 
productivity. 
The set of labor obligations included working the land of 
the landowner on an average of 10 to 14 days per month not 
necessarily consecutive on a fixed wage, which remained 0.40 
soles per day from 1914 to the middle of 1950s. On occasion, 
the turno rose to 20 or 25 days, known as maguipura or extra, 
when the tenant and his family had to work for the landlord 
not for a customary wage but for payment agreed before each 
duty period. The palla was the obligation to supply at least 
one woman to pick coca leaves for each coca harvest, and it 
was paid at 0.20 soles a day until the middle of 1950s. This 
assignment sometimes included young boys. It extended to the 
coffee crop and sometimes the palladoras were required a few 
times a year. 
The huata faena, or annual work, consisted of an 
obligation to work 10 to 15 days for food, drink, and possibly 
the gratificacion of one sol. The arrendire was also required 
to supply his dependents and peons to work on the hacienda at 
his expense, and that included food, chicha, and wages. The 
task of comisiones, comprised various kinds of duties when 
required at a wage of 0.50 soles a day. Road and maintenance 
work including the landlord's house was also an obligation in 
the condiciones. The hacendado also expected house servants, 
semaneros, to work unpaid for a fixed period of time. 
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Additional transport duty, or fletas consechas, required to 
carry 66 kilograms for each animal on the tenants possession 
up to three times a year. The tenant was compelled to pay 
herbaje, for each head of livestock in his possession above a 
certain number, and to pay for timber in excess of his 
"necessities." He was required to plant certain crops and 
prohibited to plant others. 130 He was under obligation to 
use goods produced on the hacienda, as well as sell his crop 
exclusively to or through the hacienda . 131 The hacienda 
maintained its own stores from which the peasants were forced 
to purchase the few goods they could afford. 
The landlord dealt with all legal matters for the 
peasants through his contacts in the provincial capital. No 
medical facilities existed in the valley save for the limited 
supplies that a hacendado would deem to offer. Few haciendas 
provided educational facilities for the benefit of the peasant 
children. In effect, the hacendado prevented education for 
the peasants because it would make "agitators out of workers." 
Control on the estates was imposed from above. Discipline was 
maintained through implied violence, actual violence or by the 
threat of eviction. Corporal punishment was still 
occasionally found on some haciendas. 
In many areas of Peru it was common to find that peasants 
living on the haciendas were prohibited from receiving 
nonresident visitors or visiting without the authorization of 
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the management. Association among the peasants was often 
prohibited, and generally not encouraged. On some estates in 
the valley, the peasants were forbidden to wear shoes or to 
stand in the presence of the landlord, who also still imposed 
his seigneurial rights on the women on his estate. Moreover, 
the peasants were not allowed to address the landlord in 
Spanish and attempts were made to restrict all communication 
to Quechua language. 
The tenant farmers in such a society had very limited 
contact with anyone outside the particular hacienda on which 
they lived and worked, and were dependent upon the hacendado 
for contact with the outside for selling and transportation of 
products from their plots. Hence, the flow of supplies and 
services was from individual hacendado in the valley to the 
commercial and political centers outside the valley. The 
hacendados effectuated the appropriation of surplus value 
through the control of the market outlet, which they secured 
by monopoly over the land and by the below-market cost of the 
demesne production protected by the labor-rent mechanism. The 
tenant farmer was compelled to market his product through the 
agency of the landlord and he received 50 to 60 percent of the 
product's market value in return. Coffee from the hacienda 
Maranura and produce the haciendas Santa Rosa, Huadquina, and 
Chaupimayo were marketed in this way. The cash return for 
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labor services was between one-fifth and one-quarter of the 
market wage. 132 
The persistence of the precapitalist relations of 
production, as exemplified by the tenancy system in the 
valley, suggests that they were beneficial for the landlords, 
and the use of wage-labor may have created economic 
difficulties for them by comparison. From the hacendados' 
point of view, tenancy presented advantages over wage-labor in 
return of labor, investments in technology on the hacienda, 
and the guarantee of labor. The dominant pattern of 
production relations between landowners and arrendires was 
combined with other types. The allegados, in return for their 
work that is, to substitute for a tenant farmer on the 
hacienda would get a small plot from the arrendire with whom 
they entered the contractual agreement. Under this system the 
allegado was obliged to work for the original tenant for a 
specified number of days a week, just as the arrendire did for 
the hacendado. Hence, within the hacienda system, patterns of 
patronage could in effect operate at different levels in the 
structure. In addition to allegados, sub-allegados might be 
recruited to provide the same services as the allegados did 
for the resident arrendires. 
The mode of production on the hacienda tied the tenant 
farmer to the hacendado, who owned and controlled the means of 
production, in a precapitalist relations of production. 
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The hacienda mode of production was not geared to subsistence 
production, for the hacendado was primarily interested in 
exporting to the local and external markets, and many 
haciendas were linked to nearby mining centers through the 
provision of food and coca. Some more successful haciendas 
had both labor service provided by the tenant farmers and wage 
laborers. Thus, each hacienda represented a combination of 
social relations based on different modes of production: a 
tenant system based on a precapitalist mode of production 
articulated with a capitalist mode of production. At the 
level of the tenant farmers, the precapitalist mode of 
production was combined in a similarly complex pattern of 
relations with the other mode of production. 
The preservation of precapitalist modes of production 
articulated with the emerging capitalist mode of production 
suggests a maximum feasibility for appropriation of surplus. 
The contradiction between the dual modes of appropriation and 
the requirement for capitalist expansion emerged in the period 
between 1940 and 1947. 
The increase in the global demand for coffee and its 
concomitant price increase, and the expanded demand for staple 
products, and the expansion of the internal and external 
markets in conjunction with the decrease in the costs of 
production (as an outcome of the expansion of roads and 
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railroads) resulted in increased profitability for the 
hacendados and arrendires. 
These factors exposed the constraints to capitalist 
production intrinsic in the feudal relations articulating 
hacendado and arrendire. The obstacles to further expansion 
were the market monopoly exercised by the landlord and the 
labor-service mechanism. The market monopoly prevented the 
increase in the rate of profit, and its collapse was caused by 
the presence of merchant capital, which contributed to the 
rapid increase in the coffee output by the coffee-growing 
arrendires. The second constraint, the labor-rent mechanism, 
the basis of the condiciones, is a more complex issue. The 
payment of rent in labor-service required the arrendires to 
contract hired labor or alternatively to contract a 
subtenant, to whom they in turn leased a small portion of 
their his holding. 
The use by the arrendires of two different forms of labor 
is an indication of a structural differentiation induced by 
the capitalist mode of production. The cash advanced by 
merchants for coffee allowed some of the arrendires to hire 
wage labor and eventually to increase their cultivated land. 
Unlike them, other arrendires had to sublet land in order to 
find an individual to substitute for them on the demesne. 
This resulted in the introduction of a new relation of 
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production intervening in the landlord-tenant articulation, 
and the a further stratification within the peasant group. 
In essence, the immediate roots of the peasant 
mobilization may be found in the systemic attempt of the 
hacendados to reimpose the system of serf labor, and their 
later attempt to take over the lands cultivated by the tenant 
farmers. 
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The First Stage 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Protests 
By the late 1940s, the labor structure of La Convencion 
consisted of three levels: arrendires, allegados, and 
sub-allegados. 133 To defend themselves from the demands of 
the hacendados and the insecurities of the tenancy system, 
they joined forces and set up the first organizations. The 
first union was formed in 1947 at Maramura, a hacienda of 
2,049 hectares, with 100 arrendire each working 5.3 hectares 
and 200 allegados with an average of 1. 2 hectares . 134 The 
secretary-general was an arrendire, formerly a teacher and a 
businessman. 
The demands of the union members were as follow: 
1. An eight hour workday. 
2. The right to sell directly, bypassing the hacendado 
3. Payment in cash rather than script or credits at the 
company store. 
4. Exemption of women from heavy farm work. 
5. Construction of a school. 135 
To press their demands, same peasants stopped working on 
the hacienda after eight hours. In 1948, the united 
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arrendires, allegados, and sub-alleqados gained the eight-hour 
work day. In the same year the hacendados allowed the tenants 
the right to sell their produce outside the village, to the 
market. The following year the peasants were allowed to build 
a school. The union was then dissolved as a consequence of 
government repression, only to rise again in 1957. 
The second union was recognized in 1951 on hacienda 
Mandor, involved primarily in coca production. The tenants on 
this hacienda had been allowed to sell their produce on the 
market but had been denied the right to organize. This union 
began to file protests with the Ministry of Labor in Cuzco. 
In 1952, the Odria government officially recognized it. 
Apparently the administration, although it did not change its 
position on unions, saw advantage in favoring an organization 
led by Communists, over the APRA-led union. But until 1957, 
after the fall of the Odria government, no new unions would be 
formed. 136 
In late 1954 and early 1955, the FTC established the 
Secretariat for Peasant Affairs, to provide assistance with 
grievances and further support in organizing unions on other 
haciendas. In the following years the peasants, through their 
attorneys and contacts in Cuzco, became acquainted with the 
Federacion de Trabajadores de Cuzco, a militant Communist 
labor union. 137 The Peruvian Communist party, had already 
penetrated the countryside, and by the time of the outbreak of 
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the mobilization it was familiar with the conditions in the 
area and were able to help the organizing efforts of the 
campesinos. According to the valley labor leader, 
the FTC was the only group to show any interest in 
our organizing efforts and who offered to help 
us. 138 
The help consisted of legal assistance by various lawyers 
who moved into the valley and became recognized as legal 
advisors to the peasant federation. In addition, they advised 
the peasants on organizational procedures and strategy. The 
FTC also sent labor leaders, who were of Indian origin and 
were easily accepted among the union members. The leaders of 
the peasant sindicatos in the valley were local men, with but 
one major exception, elected to positions of leadership from 
within their own hacienda and not brought in from outside. 139 
Likewise, the federation of peasant unions was composed of 
legitimate representatives from the different hacienda peasant 
unions. 
By 1958, peasant sindicatos on eight haciendas in La 
Convencion and the sindicatos from Lares joined together on a 
regional basis to form a valley federation, Federacion de 
Sindicatos Campesinales de la Convencion y Lares. In addition 
to this principal peasant union, a small number of peasant 
sindicatos sponsored by APRA and led by a local arrendire, 
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organized into FENCAP unions. APRA, while strong in the 
northern coastal area of Peru, had limited influence in the 
Cuzco area. 
Analyzing the early stages of the mobilization, Wesley 
Craig found that both arrendires and allegados were 
represented. The peasant representatives had been migrants to 
the area within five to fifteen years prior to their 
involvement. The elected leadership was generally the more 
acculturated peasants of the area, who could speak Spanish in 
addition to the native Quechua. Based on his findings, Craig 
concluded 
Despite the outside advisory roles of the lawyers 
and various FTC representatives to the valley, the 
major part of the organization and development, 
particularly during the early phase from 1952 to 
1960, was primarily an autonomous movement within 
the valley and constituted an unusual Latin 
American phenomenon of a rural labor union 
organizing itself from the bottom up rather than 
being organized and directed from outside. 140 
The initial demands made were moderate. Total abolition 
of labor obligations was not sought, nor was land reform 
demanded. Some of the initial leaders were evangelicos, or 
Protestants, but the total percentage was too small to make 
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the difference attributed to them, and moreover, they did not 
maintain leadership positions . 141 
The Second Stage 
The rise in the momentum of the second stage in the 
mobilization corresponds with the decline of coffee prices 
from 1954 to 1961. 142 By the mid-1950s, the tenant farmers 
had gained an important stake in the economy of the valley. 
A government report for 1957 estimated per capita production 
in La Convencion at 1,357 soles per year, compared to 260 
soles per year the annual average for Cuzco. According to the 
report, the problem was not a lack of resources but a highly 
unequal distribution of these resources 
Nine owners (4.3 percent of the total) each held 
lands o over 10,000 hectares. More than 57 percent 
of the territory was in their hands. One 
hacendado, Alfredo Romainville, owned 152,480 
hectares. Sixty-six owners held land of 1,000 and 
10,000 hectares, while eighty-eight owners held 
lands of from 50 to 10,000 hectares and twenty-five 
owners had plots small enough that they could work 
them themse 1 ves . 143 
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In 1961, at the insistence of the hacendados, an 
investigator from the Ministry of Labor was sent to the valley 
to study the situation and make recommendations. The 
investigator found that the 
infrastructure lagged behind 
development of the social 
the economic growth. The 
peasants showed symptoms of nutritional deficiencies, 85 
percent of them lived in unsanitary conditions, less than 40 
percent of the potential pupils were enrolled in primary 
schools and that high school education was available only to 
those who lived in the provincial capital of Quillabamba. 
When the findings were presented to the commission in Lima, it 
suggested that the condiciones as a form of contractual labor 
arrangement should be abolished. Because the government was 
not ready to act on this recommendation, the report was 
shelved. In La Convencion, the political leverage of the 
hacendados was waning, but the region was a not political 
asset. It is important to remember that during the Odria 
administration, most union activity was illegal, and only with 
the installation of President Prado did all political 
activities become legalized and votes become important. 
With the federation as a bargaining agent, the tenant 
farmers escalated their demands. This time, the peasants 
sought the elimination of the obligations by substituting them 
for rent paid in cash, and long-termed land leases. The 
federation also demanded that tenants be permitted to sell 
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their coffee directly to commercial markets, without any 
interference form the hacendado. Although initially lawyers 
from Cuzco, of different political affiliations, helped in 
representing the peasants in their demands, by this later 
stage many had moved into the valley and had become the 
recognized legal advisors, exerting direct leverage on the 
peasants' decision-making processes. 
In the area of Huadquina, on the haciendas Santa Rosa 
and Chaupimayo, the mobilization became more radicalized than 
elsewhere. 144 When peasant union was formed as a response to 
the situation, a ministerial resolution prohibited the 
arrendires and allegados from forming syndicates, and made it 
possible for the authorities, at least temporarily, to jail 
the leaders and declare the union illegal. 145 
The year 1960 was a turning point in the development of 
rural mobilization of La Convencion: 130 unions belonged to 
the peasant federation, and its membership included over 
11,000 campesinos and 6,000 agricultural workers in the 
valley. The mobilization once restricted to the southern part 
of La Convencion was beginning to assume the proportions of a 
real movement. 146 The natural momentum developed by the 
original peasant unions now began to realize collective 
strength and show solidarity. One example was the "sympathy 
strike" that took place in June-July 1960, in which the 
peasant unions from various haciendas stopped work for their 
110 
hacendados because peasants on one hacienda were mistreated. 
Representatives of the Peasant Federation of Cuzco were sent 
to organize the colones in the provinces of Paucartambo and 
Calca. The working conditions on hacienda Chawaytiri, in the 
province of Calca, during the potato harvest of 1960 
accelerated the process of union organization and the ensuing 
plans for a strike. After beginning the strike the colones 
set up their organization and began electing officials from 
their own communities. In 1962, they submitted a written 
complaint to Ministry of Labor and Indian Affairs in Cuzco. 
The strike continued until June of that year. The 
unionization on Chawaytiri, brought immediate "symbolic 
changes in their interpersonal relationships." Although, the 
colones signed their contract with the hacendados with the aid 
of the Peasant Federation of Cuzco, the following months saw 
them shift their efforts from getting contract enforcement to 
securing claims for land ownership. The first claim for the 
right to purchase land on hacienda Chawaytiri was lodged in 
December 1962; this phenomenon was not unique, it was 
occurring elsewhere in the department. The power of the 
mestizo landholding elite was declining and a new leadership 
was emerging from among the schoolteachers and businessmen. 
This group originated from the mestizos and cholos in the 
area, and studied at the University in Cuzco during the period 
when the government was emphasizing the role of the teacher as 
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an agent of change in the community. 147 Of equal importance 
was the process of political radicalization that swept the 
country from the late 1950s and through the 1960s. University 
students held meetings and demonstrated in favor of agrarian 
reform and peasant mobilization. Many became involved with 
the Peasant Federation of Cuzco. 
The emergence of Hugo Blanco as a leader of a union from 
hacienda Chaupimayo increased the militancy of the peasants in 
the valley. A native of Cuzco, an agronomist educated in 
Argentina, Blanco was fluent in Quechua and Spanish. He began 
to work as an allegado for an arrendire, and because of his 
leadership qualities was soon elected to be the representative 
of the hacienda's union to the federation. 
A certain revolutionary feeling existed on Chaupimayo: 
union meetings were held daily and alcoholic drinks were 
forbidden. For better protection against the landlords, the 
peasants organized themselves in hamlets. Another way to 
enhance the strength of the peasant group consciousness and 
the collective action were mass meetings in Quillabamba and 
Cuzco. A school was built on the hacienda, and teachers were 
brought in from Cuzco. The teachers contracted to work for 
the schools in the valley, an example set by Chaupimayo, 
developed a program that explained the basis of class 
struggle, various agricultural issues, and developments in 
farming technology. 148 Chaupimayo became the base at which 
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several self-defense training courses were given, and at a 
later date the locus for the development of militia groups to 
protect themselves the peasant's families against possible 
violent acts committed by the hacendados. These 
para-military organizations were used by the Blanco in his 
confrontation to gain political power. The peasants in 
different unions participated in general community improvement 
works such as road construction, irrigation, bridges, public 
buildings, and medical offices without any help from the 
government. 
In 1961, the Federacion Departmental de Campesinos y 
Comunidades del Cuzco was formed with 214 sections. Blanco 
and his followers sought support for more radical tactics such 
as occupation of hacienda land and violence. Their slogan 
became Tierra o Muerte. Early in 1962, the federation decided 
to call for a general boycott against the hacendados. Based 
on the decision of the federation, no arrendire, allegado, or 
sub-allegado was to work for the landlords in the valley, and 
no payment for the rental of the parcels was to be paid. 
On April 24, 1962, the Prado government issued a decree 
that abolished the condiciones and specified that tenant 
farmers must pay rent to the hacendados for the continued use 
of the parcelas. The peasants refused to pay rent. In May 
1962, with considerable support, Blanco was elected 
secretary-general of the federation. However, the elections 
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laid bare the differences between the groups in the peasant 
movement: the reformists, the older FTC-inspired leaders, and 
the radical supporters of Hugo Blanco. 
The unions controlled by the arrendires, under the 
influence of the FTC, corroborated the Prado government's 
position regarding the situation in the valley and opted for 
the maintenance of the status quo. The arrendires, once they 
received ownership of the land they possessed (some of them as 
many as four parcelas), changed into the new rural 
bourgeoisie. In control of the unions, the arrendires, once 
the vanguard of the rural mobilization, were able to dominate 
and repress the peasant movement. Basically the arrendires, 
faced with new opportunities, initiated the confrontation 
against the hacendados and then transformed themselves into 
the dominant and conservative class of the new arrangements in 
the countryside. 
With the capitalist relations of production clearly 
established between the new class of proprietors and the rural 
proletariat, obligations of wage labor replaced those of labor 
service. The allegados and sub-allegados, as part of the 
smaller rural bourgeoisie, and the rural proletariat were not 
satisfied with developments resulting from the April decree, 
which favored the original tenant farmers; they wanted radical 
reform. The unions they belonged to were led by Hugo Blanco, 
and they sustained the peasant mobilization after April 1962. 
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Therefore, by 1962 a pattern of mobilization had emerged: 
first, the organization of the union, the bargaining agent for 
its members, and then the struggle for better contractual 
agreements with the hacendado. The final stage was 
represented by the struggle for land ownership. 
National elections on June 10, 1962, failed to give a 
majority to any of the three major candidates. The decision 
passed to Congress. On July 18 the military annulled the 
elections and took power to prevent its traditional enemy, 
APRA leader Raul Haya de la Torre, from being chosen to lead 
a coalition. By this time, occupation of the hacienda lands, 
urged by Blanco, had been carried out in a coordinated 
fashion. The military junta recognized the de facto control 
of the land by the tenant farmers and in a decree issued same 
year, indicated that the peasants could keep the parcels but 
that in order to secure title they had to pay the government 
which would handle the hacendados . This act brought the 
complete separation of the campesinos from the hacendados. 149 
Changed Relations 
The general boycott declared against all hacendados in 
the valley, whereby no arrendire, allegado, or sub-allegado 
was to work for any landlord in the valley nor was any payment 
to be made for rental of parcels, removed the traditional 
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labor supply. The cost of employing habilitados was too high. 
The lack of labor was increased by the government road 
construction projects in the highlands, which paid higher 
wages than did the hacendados. The drop in production on the 
hacienda lands can be correlated with the increasingly 
dominant capitalist relations of production. The hacendados 
who produced coca and coffee were affected the most. It will 
be recalled that these hacendados relied on the labor services 
of the arrendires and their families during the harvest time. 
The entire coca production was labor intensive, not only 
during the harvesting. In the absence of a cheap labor 
supply, the coca became less profitable, compounded by falling 
prices during the period 1963-65. The hacendados who switched 
to coffee production showed a marked decrease in production. 
Many hacendados demonstrated little initiative in 
handling the labor problem. A great majority passively waited 
for the representatives from the government agencies dealing 
with the subdivision of the lands, as a way of getting some 
money so that they could leave the valley. A contributing 
factor to the inability to change was the advanced age of many 
of the hacendados, plus their children's apparent lack of 
interest in hacienda matters. Few hacendados were able to 
make the adjustment to the labor changes. The ones that 
survived, owned haciendas where even before the mobilization 
began there was a higher rate of capital investment in the 
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form of wage-labor and machinery. Sugar cane and cocoa were 
the crops that required large-scale labor input; therefore 
they were also adversely affected by the labor shortage unless 
the hacendados decided on increased mechanization . 150 In 
effect, the capitalist mode of production, in articulation 
with other modes of production, became dominant. The legal 
abrogation of the condiciones, that is, the labor-rent 
mechanism, ended the use of precapitalist relations of 
production. 151 
From its inception the rural mobilization was organized 
and led by the wealthier segment of the rural population, the 
arrendires. The arrendires, when faced with the likelihood of 
losing their land, their source of income, reacted by 
organizing around the collective interest. Their dominant 
economic position did not correspond to the position of 
political subordination to the landlord. As the most advanced 
segment in the rural population involved in the process of 
capital accumulation, the tenant farmers were at same time the 
group that provided the largest amount labor service on the 
demesne. However, their political demands reflected the 
collective economic interests of the organized group: the 
abolition of monopoly over the sale of the tenant's produce, 
the eight-hour working day on the demesne, the abolition of 
the labor-rent service mechanism, cash payment for extra-labor 
performances, etc. The peasant union, from the beginning, 
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represented the instrument used by the arrendires to 
counteract the situation of insecurity maintained by the 
landlord regarding the use of land. 152 
Thus, the tenant farmers became the vanguard of the 
peasant organization, and created and supported the unions as 
a function of their own class interests. The alliance between 
the arrendires, allegados, and sub-allegados created a novel 
situation for the landlord; a united front with a leadership 
from within, from the chela segment of the population. 153 In 
political terms, the struggle involved the mobilization of a 
multi-class alliance, composed of tenants, sub-tenants, and 
small merchants, against the hacendados. At this time, the 
unions become the only representatives of the peasant group, 
and they established direct relations with the judicial and 
administrative government offices as well as the departmental 
ministries in Cuzco, to which they presented their complains 
and demands. The union actions were within the legal 
parameters; their objectives included protection for the 
tenant farmers against eviction from their plots and demand 
for immediate improvements in the condition of the peasantry 
was of interest to the majority of their members. 
For the arrendires, the new rural bourgeoisie, the 
ownership of the land was the issue -one which in fact 
questioned the entire hacienda system. The arrendires 
directed the struggle for the ownership of the land to end all 
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insecurities involved in the former relations of production. 
The allegados and sub-allegados, who participated in the 
mobilization, eventually received some compensation; but it 
was only the arrendire segment that developed into a class for 
itself, with a class consciousness and a goal. The arrendire 
was the only segment whose actions reflected a degree of group 
consciousness because their interests received full economic 
articulation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Peasant mobilization is rooted in long-term changes in 
the structures of society, the economy, and politics. The 
historical survey of rural protest in the southern Peruvian 
highlands, indicates that in the formative and mature colonial 
periods, Indian ethnicity played a significant role, and the 
peasants rallied around community-based solidarity. Despite 
the limited nature of creole support, these movements appeared 
as strong social protests within the system rather than 
replacing it. The analysis of rural protests in the twentieth 
century shows that modernization produced changes affecting 
all facets of previous relations and creating conditions 
favorable to the organized protests. 
Although rural protest was historically endemic to the 
Andean region, intense agrarian mobilization had rarely 
resulted in organized protest. And then, between 1958 and 
1965, three massive peasant protests swept through the central 
and southern highlands. In the Valley of La Convencion, an 
area where turbulence was virtually unknown, discontented 
peasants on dozens of coffee haciendas mobilized against their 
landlords in a successfully organized rural protest. These 
dramatic manifestations of rural discontent shocked the 
country in part because they appeared during a generally 
tranquil period. 
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If La Convencion Valley was a "traditional" agrarian 
area, how can we account for the mobilization? Certainly, the 
tensions introduced by modernization processes created the 
conditions that led to peasant organization by altering the 
patron-client relations in a manner that was unfavorable to 
the peasant. 154 Charles Tilly reminds us that structural 
changes will affect the rules of collective action and will 
alter the way people act together in pursuit of shared 
interests. 155 
The conditions that made this area the seat of rural 
mobilization have been treated in this study. In tracing 
causes for the absence of previous protests and the new 
challenges posed by resistance, key conditions of rural 
setting were identified: the land and the patron-client 
relationship. The analysis of the area's land structure 
served to distinguish among different social segments in the 
rural society, uncovered the dialectic of internal 
contradictions in the relations between the classes, and 
pointed to the causes of the mobilization itself by revealing 
the new configuration that followed social change. Then by 
focusing on the explanatory device of patron-client 
relationship, in the context of the articulation of modes of 
production method, the social transformations were revealed, 
as they were taking place. Under these conditions, a new form 
of relationship was generated, this time involving the 
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arrendire. These changes aided the rise to political 
prominence of the cholo, as embodied by the arrendire. 
The initiating factor of change was the introduction of 
the coffee into a region that, with the exception of few coca 
producing haciendas, was traditionally based on subsistence 
agriculture. Coffee as a cash crop did not necessarily 
require major capital outlays; production could be combined 
with the growing of foodstuffs. Harvesting and processing 
were labor intensive procedures. 
Jeffery Paige contends that "the social organization of 
the coffee production," that is, of the wet-processed coffee, 
was the source of the peasant movement in La Convencion, and 
that in areas where dry-processing was used, the hacienda 
system remained intact. 156 Accordingly, the processing of 
the arabica coffee through two distinct phases, increased its 
profitability to the tenant farmer and created the conditions 
for more socialization among the peasants, leading to the 
development of dyadic relationships previously non-existent 
among the tenant-farmers. 157 In general, structural 
conditions that affected peasant actions included the degrees 
and bases of solidarity within the community, the degree of 
autonomy and control from the landlords and the relations of 
the state's coercive sanctions against the peasants' 
collective actions. 158 
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In La Convencion, where the typical communal village was 
absent, prior to peasant labor organization, the peasant 
settlement pattern on the hacienda consisted of widely 
scattered family units along the periphery of the landlord's 
cultivated lands . 159 This distribution was marked by high a 
degree of isolation and very limited social contact. 
However, only after the development of peasant unions, the 
tenant farmers began a process of cohesion, based on greater 
orientation toward the community. 
Indeed, the data on rural mobilization in southern 
highlands indicate a direct relationship between the existence 
of independent peasant communities, coffee production, and 
degrees of mobilization. Because, in the absence of 
comunidades indiqenas, mobilized communi ties predominantly 
engaged in coffee production generated a higher degree of 
solidarity than those retaining other types of crops, the 
emphasis remained on land tenure patterns rather than specific 
crops as being favorable to mobilization. 160 
Available evidence on land ownership in comparable areas 
where haciendas survived shows that the principle of private 
property was introduced at the earliest stage of colonization. 
Moreover, there are indications that during the period 
referred to as the "fiebre del cafe," investors recreated the 
hacienda by accumulating large tracts of land for the purpose 
of coffee plantations. 161 Analysis of the hacienda system 
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exposes this institution to be the locus of all the 
contradictions that affected the agrarian structure in the 
valley, the monopoly over land and market exercised by the 
landowners, and the emergence of the arrendires as a 
determinant group who would take over the organization of 
production. 162 
Direct contact between the merchant and the arrendires 
increased the participation of the tenant in the economy, 
resulting in the accumulation of capital and the formation of 
the internal market. Although the availability of capital, 
allowed the tenants to invest in the land, thereby 
continuously raising productivity, further increases in coffee 
output could be achieved only by expanding the area under 
cultivation or hiring more workers. The preservation of 
precapitalist relations of production, in the form of the 
condiciones, had important consequences for the development of 
agrarian capitalism. 
This study of labor relations in La Convencion has 
established that capitalist relations of production based on 
wage labor were articulated with precapitalist relations based 
on labor service, and, in effect, reinforced each other. 
Capitalism was the mode of production in the valley before the 
era of mobilization, as evidenced by the presence of wage 
labor and by the market basis of production. The 
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precapitalist relations of production neither maintained nor 
determined the conservation of institutional arrangements such 
as condiciones; nor did they restrain the development of 
agrarian capitalism. Consequently, once the arrendires were 
free of obligations, some of them found it cheaper to lease 
out a small parcel of land to the allegado in exchange for his 
labor service both on the hacienda and the arriendo. Others, 
from among the arrendires who had settled earlier, relied on 
wage laborers rather than land transfer, or used both methods 
to ensure an available labor force. This was significant 
because it resulted in the emergence of rich, middle, and poor 
strata of peasants, and sanctioned the development of an acute 
form of class struggle among them over the reproduction of 
non-demesne property relations. In this process the rich and 
middle peasants displaced their poorer counterparts. 
In this rural environment, the arrendires represented the 
most dynamic element at the core of the development of 
capitalist mode of production in agriculture. They had an 
objective to be achieved through mobilization; that is, to 
gain ownership of the land. Following Joel Migdal's analysis, 
the arrendires were the peasants who underwent the most rapid 
exposure to market forces, and would be the ones to respond to 
political stimuli involving solutions to their 
market-induced problems. By contrast, Popkin suggests that 
some peasants will break out of traditional relationships by 
125 
cultivating 
outcome of 
new ties, and that mobilization will be 
self-interest rather than a function 
the 
of 
pre-existing solidarity. Therefore, the organization of the 
tenants in peasant unions was the arrendires' political 
reaction to the landlords' attempt to take over the 
tenant-cultivated lands. Through these formal organizations 
the arrendires altered the traditional patron-client balance 
and other kinship ties, thus giving prime importance to new 
social structures within the hacienda system. 
The political demands of the peasants reflected the 
economic interests of their leadership. To maintain the 
alliance with the allegados and sub-allegados against the 
landlords, the arrendires included demands for higher wages, 
the eight-hour work day, education, and improvements in their 
working conditions as part of their general objectives. The 
peasant unions, and later the Peasant Federation of Cuzco, 
became the only channels for any peasant and hacendado 
relations. Moreover, the unions represented the final break 
in the patron-client relationship. The heterogenous 
composition of the peasant unions is significant because it 
represents a multi-class alliance. 
The use of dissent to overcome the traditional influence 
of the landlord suggests the presence of arrendires' rational 
interests in contrast to the traditional bonds existing in the 
hacienda system. The traditional elites' resistance to change 
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was the point of departure in the strategy of formation of 
peasant organizations as a negative reference group to 
stimulate cohesion among the peasants. Thus, the fact that 
the formation of the peasant unions was strongly opposed and 
perpetuated a conflictive situation had a positive effect. It 
helped the arrendires to strengthen the cohesion of the 
peasant unions, and it offered an example of proactive action 
on their part. 163 Hence, the local elite's orientation 
influenced the actions of the subordinate groups. The 
elevation of the cholo segment was facilitated by absentee 
ownership, but the limited patronage cholos could afford and 
the weakness of their ties to the rest of the rural strata 
promoted for a while, the further radicalization of other 
factions. 
The arrendires/cholos became the rural bourgeoisie, 
allied with merchant capital and opposed to the landlords. 
The rural proletariat, dependent for its survival on the 
arrendires, did not achieve the unity of purpose or 
consciousness required to be a class. The allegados and 
sub-allegados became the petty-bourgeoisie on its way to 
proletarianization. The realignment of the valley's social 
stratification was the product of the arrendires' desire to 
free themselves from the obligations that tied them to their 
patrons. Introducing the allegado, and the sub-allegados, who 
substituted for the arrendires' labor service on the hacienda, 
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was the initial fragmentation in the dependence of the tenant 
on his hacendado; the establishment of the peasant unions 
represented the final break. 
For the cholo segment, the goal of collective action was 
political power; they were therefore interested in maintaining 
the economic incentives as a collective good in order to 
preserve the momentum generated by mobilization. The cholo 
leaders realized that only separate and "selective" incentives 
would stimulate a rational individual to act in a 
group-oriented way. The "selective incentives" offered were 
either negative or positive, in that they could either coerce 
by punishing those who failed to bear the costs of the group 
action, or they could induce those who acted in the group 
interest. 164 
The arrendire/cholo group offers similarities to Moncur 
Olson's "latent group. " According to Olson, such a group can 
become a "mobilized" latent group through the use of either 
coercion or positive rewards. By using the collective good as 
the main appeal and the selective incentives as an additional 
stimulus, the unions performed their function; that is, 
satisfied a demand, furthered an interest, or met a need for 
a large number of people. No other means could do any longer. 
The direction of the mobilization was conditioned by the 
arrendires' ideological position. Consequently, the 
mobilization became segmented into well defined zones: the 
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reformist zone, under the influence of the Peruvian Communist 
Party, at the time that the party ideology espoused support 
for the national bourgeoisie's effort to eradicate feudalism; 
and the radicalized zone led by Hugo Blanco, who advocated 
revolution. It should be stressed that the arrendires group 
who owned an average of 17 hectares a piece became the most 
militant element in the mobilization, and not the arrendires 
who possessed parcels with an average of five hectares each. 
The rich tenant farmers, the most progressive component 
in the mobilization, gave their political support to Blanco, 
because he was the only one involved in the struggle for 
ownership of land. Finally, the peasant unions, influenced by 
the FTC and APRA, were more conciliatory and institutional in 
their approach to the problems between the hacendados and the 
peasants. The early leadership's organizational expertise 
indicated, not only the party's influence but also a higher 
level of acculturation, with sufficient skills to adapt the 
urban trade unions' model to the rural environment. 
Popkin, Migdal, and others do not underestimate the 
revolutionary abilities of certain middle-class rural strata, 
but they all believe in the need for external influence and 
help in the process of building a mobilization superstructure. 
In La Convencion, however, this did not obtain, because PCP 
especially, and to a lesser extent APRA, began to penetrate 
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the surrounding highlands in the 1930s. The improved quality 
of education in the provincial center of Quillabamba aided the 
maturation of the cholos as effective and knowledgeable 
leaders. Many of them maintained contacts with the highland 
villages from which they had originally migrated and became 
influential actors in furthering the mobilization of the 
Quechua communities in the surrounding highlands. 
Consequently, this group of professional cholos emerged as 
successful political leaders in many of Peru's rural 
areas . 165 
The traditional basis of the ethnic relations within the 
old caste like system had been reconstituted by the conquest. 
Apart from the Indian nobility, the mass of the indigenous 
population was transformed into a peasantry . 166 In time, a 
thorough mestization occurred, often attended by a cult of 
indigenismo, glorifying an Inca utopia. But mestizo culture 
is essentially Hispanic and in rural areas many of the elites 
were mestizos. 
The department of Cuzco, forms part of the region known 
as Mancha India, which encompassed the areas of Ancash, 
Apurimac, Ayacucho, Puno, and Huancavelica. 167 The 
demographic changes in the valley indicate that the bulk of 
migration to the area took place from the Mancha, but no 
single province served as the major source of migrant labor. 
Based on the available data on the ethnic factor in the 
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mobilization in La Convencion, and judging from other 
situations in Peru, it can be presumed that in the process of 
out-migration from their native communities many of the 
tenants acquired new status. Often the migrant peasants from 
the sierra were smallholders themselves, who saw in becoming 
an arrendire or allegado as a new challenge, and opportunity 
to improve on the former condition. The consequently high 
degree of tension can be a corollary on how the hacendados 
perceived their tenants and the tenant-farmers' self-identity, 
and the developing struggle resulted from societal 
inconsistencies 
competition. 168 
rather than from ethnically based 
By the middle 1950s, during the period of the 
convivencia, the state had become the most important agent for 
social change in the southern highlands. Theda Skocpol 
advises us on the importance of the timing of the peasants' 
revolutionary potential in conjuncture with the role of the 
state in the context of world historical development. The 
centralized state, representative of the coastal bourgeoisie's 
interests, undertook public works projects, entered and 
regulated the labor market, and through direct intervention, 
weakened the hacendados' hold on the rural population. It 
supported the development of agrarian capitalism, and placed 
it itself between the peasant and the landlord in an effort to 
undermine the power of the landlords. 
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By the late 1950s, the emergence of a labor surplus in 
agriculture broke the logic of internal subsistence and 
provided the objective conditions for the state intervention, 
thereby attempting through legal course to eliminate the 
remnants of precapi talist social relations. The state's logic 
was geared to the development of agrarian capitalism in order 
to increase food production and agricultural exports that 
would meet the urban middle class's need for cheap food and 
foreign exchange requirements for industrialization. The 
state could meet those goals could be met only by relaxing its 
traditional sanctions against political organizing. It was 
exactly at the same time, that unionization efforts in La 
Convencion increased. The acceleration of the process of 
mobilization, in defense against the hacendados' increased 
demands, can be directly related to the political freedom 
policies implemented by the Prado administration through the 
strategy of convivencia. 
During the 1950s, the spread of technological innovation 
in the sugar industry along the coast coincided with rapid 
increases in the available labor supply from the sierra. 
This, in turn, caused labor surplus conditions, and as a 
consequence, the government promotion of migration to new 
colonizing areas. Nevertheless, agricultural laborers and 
seasonal laborers constituted the bulk of the migration to the 
valley, and very few new tenancies were established. Could 
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there be any correlation between the type of individuals 
migrating to new regions, the forms of labor and land control, 
and state intervention? Studies in Andean seasonal migration 
show that individuals respond to market forces and rationalize 
their distribution of labor from among productive regions. 
Furthermore, the choice of migrants is influenced by their 
relations with both the local elites and the state. 169 We 
have no studies on the migrations in La Convencion, though we 
do know more about the neighboring areas involved in coffee 
production. They show that, in support of the commercial 
interests in the altiplano, the merchants attempted to 
consolidate their control on the coffee market and kept the 
price down by favoring smallholder production. Ultimately, 
the confrontation between the different elite fractions, in 
pursuit of short-term interests, undermined coffee 
production. 170 
The penetration of capitalism in the agrarian sector 
proved to be a slow process, and in the end it connected 
remote areas to the world market. World coffee prices and, in 
general, the world economic cycle, directly affected the 
course of the mobilization. The international context thus 
becomes important as it impinges upon national 
development . 171 The immediate reference to the effects of 
the Cuban Revolution on the direction of the mobilization in 
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La Convencion highlighted the Blanco faction's use of the 
slogan "Land or Death. "172 
Students of agrarian conflict generally agree that the 
penetration of capitalism and its consequent development will 
cause changes in rural areas that will affect the peasantry. 
The issue still remains as to the role of the peasants as 
defendants or as instigators. 
It has become evident that we cannot look at an event, 
like the one described here and evaluate it from the point of 
view of one all-encompassing social theory. In the attempt to 
develop testable generalizations regarding rural mobilization 
in coffee-producing areas, the need is for comparative 
historical work rather than individual case studies. 
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century. 
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151 
Average Annual Price for Coffee in La Convencion 
in Soles per Kilogram 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1.21 
1.27 
3.26 
3.97 
4.06 
7.15 
7.83 
9.01 
9.63 
14.77 
Price Index: 
1945 100 
1954 1,221 
Source: Craig, "From Hacienda to Community," 31-32. 
114. Gerrit Huizer, The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants 
in Latin America (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972), 114. 
115. The data regarding the size and number of the haciendas 
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transformation. 
between feudal 
a continuous two-stage revolutionary 
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landlords and the bourgeoisie, and the 
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120. Hobsbawm, "A Case of Nee-Feudalism," 39. 
121. Scott in "Peasants, Proletarianization and the 
Articulation," views the engache, as a historically specific 
stage in the development of the regional labor market. 
122. Craig, "Peru: The Peasant Movement," 280. 
123. The system of habilitado not to be confused with what is 
known as habilidado system, as form of cash advance on future 
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125. Ibid., xiv. 
126. Ibid. I xx. 
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dense indigenous population. The Spaniards concentrated on 
developing the coastal areas, for economic reasons and 
strategic, and more importantly to destabilize the Cuzco 
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Szeminski, "Why Kill A Spaniard?" in Resistance, Rebellion, 
and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th 
Centuries, 184. 
129. Sydel Silverman, "Patronage and Community-Nation 
Relationships in Central Italy" in Friends, Followers and 
Factions eds. Steffen W. Schmidt, James c. Scott, Carl Lande, 
and Laura Guasti (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977), 296. 
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130. Hobsbawm, "A Case of Nee-Feudalism," 33-36, suggests 
that the cultivation of sugar cane involved certain 
seigneurial rights. 
131. Ibid., 39-40. 
132. Fioravanti, Latifundio y sindicalismo, 78. 
133. Ibid., 23, 181. 
In La Convencion valley, there were approximately 4,000 
arrendires in the area with 12,000 allegados and an unknown 
number of day laborers, altogether about 60,000 people. 
134. Fioravanti, Latifundio y sindicalismo, 85-89. 
When analyzing the condiciones for the arrendires on the 
hacienda Maranura it indicates that: in 1934 the total number 
of days for the turno at 40 centavos and maguipura at 50 
centavos were 134 by 1934 the number of days in labor service 
were 156 at a price of 50 and 70 centavos respectively. 
Consequently, the hacendados increased the labor service 
requirements and at almost no expense for them. In 1934, the 
allegados had to complete for the hacendado 14 days of 
maguipura. By 1943 the allegados had to complete 12 days of 
maguipura at 70 centavos/day, 12 days of faena at 70 
centavos/day , 12 days of palla at 40 centavos/day, with the 
additional 132 of palla performed by the women which total to 
168 days of labor service rendered for the hacendado directly 
on the demesne. The allegado had the obligation to work for 
the arrendire, 78 days on the hacienda and 22 days on the 
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arriendo. Therefore, the total number of days of labor service 
were 268, which seriously limited the sub-tenant's available 
time on his plot. 
135. William F. Whyte and Giorgio Alberti, Power, Politics 
and Progress: Social Change in Rural Peru, 47. 
136. Fioravanti, Latifundio y sindicalismo, 160. 
137. William F. Whyte and Giorgio Alberti. Power, Politics 
and Progress: Social Change in Rural Peru, 47-48. 
138. Craig, "From Hacienda to Community," 39. 
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activist. He was the son of a lawyer from Cuzco, and he 
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140. Craig, "Peru: The Peasant Movement," 287. 
141. Fioravanti, Latifundio y sindicalismo, passim. 
142. There is a relationship between the cyclic nature of a 
movement and the cyclic nature of the economy. Mobilization 
will begin to take place at the end of the upper cycle and a 
movement will peak at the lower level of the economic cycle. 
143. Whyte and Alberti, Power,Politics and Progress, 39. 
144. Gerrit Huizer, p.llS 
The entire property of over 100,000 hectares, belonged to the 
same family. What created the most indignation and 
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belligerence among the peasants in Chaupimayo was the abuses 
of the landlord: for example, the continued practice of 
flogging those peasants who were not servile enough. 
145. A few years later the Romainvilles were chased out of 
their hacienda. The hacienda Huadquina became the site of 
most dynamic peasant activities. Because of its size, the 
hacienda was divided, by the peasant leadership in four areas, 
and in each section a union was established. 
146. Handelman in Struggle in the Andes, 70-110, mentions 
that the demonstration effect of the peasants, first in La 
Convencion and then in adjoining comunidades was felt through 
the department. 
147. Whyte and Alberti, Power, Politics and Progress, 70-72. 
148. Fioravanti, Latifundio y sindicalismo, 213. 
Primary education system in La Convencion and Lares in 1940 
was represented by 41 schools, 3,358 students and 60 teachers. 
By 1962 there were 70 schools, 170 classrooms, 7,974 students 
and 147 teachers and during one year's period the number of 
schools increased to 87, with 218 classrooms, 9,004 students 
and 189 teachers. 
149. Craig, "Peru: The Peasant Movement," 287-90. 
150. Tom Brass, "Class Formation and Class Struggle in La 
Convencion, Peru," Journal of Peasant Studies ?(July 1980): 
432-37. 
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151. Ibid., 427-57. After 1962, in many areas in the valley, 
labor service mechanism continued to be used in exchange for 
credit. Poorer peasants in need of money to support the 
household economy, entered in agreements with the rich farmers 
to work for them instead of repayment of debt with interest. 
152. Huizer, The Revolutionary Potential, passim. 
While peasant organizations increasingly assumed the 
characteristics of a brokerage system, the flow of benefits is 
small, as the available resources. These organization seemed 
to serve the purpose of merely maintaining clienteles for 
local or national leaders. 
153. Fioravanti, in Latifundio y sindicalismo, defines cholo, 
as the individual socially situated between an Indian and a 
mestizo. 
154. Most often the material which I researched refers to the 
mobilization of the La Convencion y Lares rather than only La 
Convencion. 
155. Lynn Hunt, "Charles Tilly's Collective Action" in Vision 
and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984): 244-74. 
156. Paige, Agrarian Revolution, 170-85. 
157. Fioravanti, Latifundio y sindicalismo, passim. 
In traditional Andean peasant economy ayni corresponds to a 
dyadic relationship between two smallholders who agree to work 
on each other's land over a given period of time, while mink'a 
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refers to a large work party called for a particular day, 
during which smallholders would discharge a day's labor owed 
to the peasant on whose land the work party takes place. 
In La Convencion, however, such exchanges are called by the 
arrendires, and were organized not only by the employment of 
the substitute workers to whom wages are paid but by also by 
the social division of labor. For example, rich peasants 
linked by an ayni exchange not their personal labor but that 
of their workers, while middle and poor peasants exchanged 
their personal labor. 
158. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 114-18. 
159. Previously described in Chapter 3. 
160. Craig, "From Hacienda to Community," 87-88. 
161. I am referring to the data on the nature of 
landownership, coffee production and role of the state in El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, and Colombia. 
162. See chapter 3. 
163. For "proactive" action, see Lynn Hunt's "Charles 
Tilly's Collective Action,"in Vision and Method in Historical 
Sociology ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,1984): 244-78. 
164. Moncur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 51. 
165. Anibal Quinjano, in Gitlitz', Hacienda, Comunidad and 
Peasant, 54. 
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166. The Indian politically became a campesino. There is no 
exact translation of this word in the English language. Most 
often it has been used to mean "Indian" with a derogatory 
connotation. Generally it is used to mean peasant. 
167. The communities from the Mancha constituted a reservoir 
of manpower for the haciendas in La Convencion whenever the 
owners wanted to extend the area of cultivation or replace 
tenant-farmers. This region, which comprised 29 percent of 
the country's total population, was overwhelmingly 
agricultural and used primarily the Quechua language as its 
means of communication. 
168. As cited by Wesley Craig, E.J.E Hobsbaw.m, William Foote 
Whyte and Giorgio Alberti. 
169. Collins, Unseasonal Migrations, passim. 
170. Ibid., 157-73. 
171. In contrast to the position adopted by the followers of 
the dependency approach, which emphasized the "external 
factors" as causes for underdevelopment, Fernando E. Cardoso 
stresses the relevance of the historical processes that 
created the structures or "internal factors, " that favor 
dependent development, and especially the relationship and the 
struggle between social classes. 
17 2. Its immediate antecedents were other slogans with 
similarly revolutionary associations; hence Blanco's was a 
combination of "Land and Freedom" used by Emiliano Zapata in 
161 
the 1911 Mexican Revolution and "Fatherland or Death" utilized 
by Castro during the 1959 Cuban Revolution. 
162 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS 
Adams, Richard N. A Community in the Andes: 
Progress in Muguiyauyo. Seattle: 
Washington Press, 1959. 
Problems and 
University of 
Alexander, Robert J. Communism in Latin America. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969. 
Archetti, Eduardo P., Paul Cammack and Bryan Roberts. 
Sociology of "Developing Societies": Latin America. New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1987. 
Badie, Bertrand and Pierre 
State. Translated by 
Birnbaum. The Sociology of 
Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983. 
Baron, Solo W. The Contemporary Relevance of History: A 
Study in Approaches and Methods. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986. 
Barraclough, Solon. Agrarian Structures in Latin America. 
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. 
163 
Berghe, Pierre L. van den., and George Primov, eds. 
Inequality in the Peruvian Andes: Class and Ethnicity 
in Cuzco. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
1977. 
Bloch, Marc. French Rural History. Translated by Janet 
Sondheimer. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1966. 
Burns, Bradford E. =L=a~t=i=n~~~e~r=i=c=a~=~~A~C~o=n=c=i=s~e~I=n~t=e=r~p=r~e~t~a=t~i~v~e 
History. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1990. 
The Poverty of Progress: Latin 
~erica in the 19th Century. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980. 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. Dependency 
and Development in Latin ~erica. Translated by 
Marjory Mattingly Urquidi. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979. 
Carney, Martin. The State and Political Theory. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984. 
Chaliand, Gerard. Revolutions in the Third World: Currents 
and Conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Translated by Diana Johnstone. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1977. 
164 
Chilcote, Ronald H. Theories of Comparative Politics. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. 
Collins, Jane L. Unseasonal Migration: The Effect of Rural 
Labor Scarcity in Peru. Austin: The University of 
Texas Press, 1975. 
Debray, Regis. Revolution in the Revolution? New York: 
Grove Press, Inc., 1967. 
Dew, Edward . Politics in the Altiplano, the Dynamics of 
Change in Rural Peru. Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1969. 
Duncan, Kenneth, and Ian Rutledge, eds., with collaboration 
Colin Harding. Land and Labour in Latin America: 
Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
Durrenberger, E. Paul, ed. Chayanov, Peasants and Economic 
Anthropology. Orlando: Academic Press, Inc., 
1984. 
Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 
Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
165 
Fanon, Franz. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by 
Constance Farrington. New York: Grove Press, 1968. 
Figueroa, Adolfo. Capitalist Development and the Peasant 
Economy in Peru. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984. 
Fioravanti, Eduardo. Latifundio y sindicalismo agrario en 
el Peru: el case de los valles de la Convencion y 
Lares (1958-1964). Lima: Institute de Estudions 
Peruanas, 1974. 
Fisher, J.R. Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The 
Intendant System, 1784-1814. London: The Athlone 
Press, University of London, 1970. 
Gibson, Charles. Spain in America. New York: Harper and 
Torchbooks, 1966. 
Gitlitz, John Stephen. Hacienda, Comunidad, and Peasant 
Protest in Northern Peru. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1975. 
Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynahan, eds. Ethnicity: 
Theory and Experience. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1975. 
166 
Handelmann, Howard. Struggle in the Andes: Peasant 
Political Mobilization in Peru. Austin: The 
University of Texas Press, 1975. 
Hanke, Lewis, ed. History of Latin American Civilization: 
Sources and Interpretations. Vol.2 The Modern Age. 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967. 
Harris, Marvin. Patterns of Race in the Americas. New 
York: w.w. Norton and Company, 1964. 
Horowitz, Irving Louis, ed. Masses in Latin America. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 
Huizer, Gerrit. The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in 
Latin America. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
Books, 1972. 
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing 
Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. 
Johnson, John J.,ed. Continuity and Change in Latin 
America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 
Katz, Friedrich, ed. Riot, Rebellion and Revolution: Rural 
Social Conflict in Mexico. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988. 
167 
Keith, Robert G. Conquest and Change: The Emergence of the 
Hacienda System on the Peruvian Coast. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1976. 
Keith, Robert G., ed. Haciendas and Plantations in Latin 
American History. New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, Inc., 1977. 
Kincaid, A. Douglas. Agrarian Development, Peasant 
Mobilization and Social Change in Central America: 
A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor: U.M.I., 1987. 
Klaren, Peter F., and Thomas J. Bossert, eds. Promise of 
Development: Theories of Change in Latin America. 
Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1986. 
Kohli, Atul, ed. The State and Development in the Third 
World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 
Lambert, Jacques. Latin America: Social Structures and 
Political Institutions. Translated by Helen Kate!. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. 
LaMond, Tullis F. Lord and Peasant in Peru: A Paradigm of 
Political and Social Change. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1970. 
168 
Landsberger, Henry A. ed., Latin American Peasant 
Movements. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. 
Landsberger, Henry A. Rural Protest: Peasant 
Movements and Social Change. London: MacMillan Press, 
Ltd.,1973. 
Langer, Erick D. Economic Change and Rural Resistance in 
Southern Bolivia, 1850-1930. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1989. 
Lehmann, David, ed. Ecology and Exchange in the Andes. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Lockhart, James, and Stuart B. Schwartz. Early Latin 
America: A History of Colonial Spanish America and 
Brazil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Long, Norman, and Bryan Roberts, eds. Miners, Peasants and 
Entrepreneurs: Regional Development in the Central 
Highlands of Peru. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984. 
Lukacs, Georg. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in 
Marxist Dialectics. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968. 
169 
Mallon, Florencia E. The Defence of Community in Peru's 
Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle in Capitalist 
Transition, 1860-1940. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983. 
Malloy, James M., ed. Authoritarianism and Corporatism in 
Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1977. 
Mariategui, Jose Carlos. Seven Interpretative Essays on the 
Peruvian Reality. Translated by Marjory Urquidi. 
Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1988. 
McClintock, Cynthia. Peasant Cooperatives and Political 
Change in Peru. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1981. 
Migdal, Joel s. Peasants, Politics, and Revolutions: 
Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the 
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974. 
Strong Societies and Weak States: 
State-Society Relations and State Capabilities In The 
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988. 
170 
Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 
Morner, Magnus. The Andean Past: Land Societies and 
Conflicts. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985. 
Munck, Renaldo, Politics and Dependency in the Third 
World: The Case of Latin America. London: Zed Books 
Ltd., 1984. 
Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action: Public 
Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965. 
Orlove, Benjamin s., and Glynn Custred, eds. Land and Power 
in Latin America: Agrarian Economies and Social 
Processes in the Andes. New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, Inc., 1980. 
Orlove, Benjamin s., Michael w. Foley and Thomas F. Love, 
eds., State, Capital and Rural Society: 
Anthropological Perspectives on Political Economy in 
Mexico and the Andes. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989. 
171 
Oxaal, Ivar, Tony Barnett, and David Booth, eds. Beyond the 
Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in 
Latin America and Africa. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1975. 
Paige, Jeffery M. Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements 
and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World. 
New York: The Free Press, 1978. 
Pearse, Andrew. The Latin American Peasant. London: Frank 
Cass and Co. Ltd., 1975. 
Pike, Frederick B. The Modern History of Peru. New York: 
Praeger Inc., Publishers, 1967. 
Popkin, Samuel L. The Rational Peasant: The Political 
Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979. 
Porter, Roy, and Mikulas Teich, eds. Revolutions in 
History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
Pryor, Frederic L. The Origins of the Economy: A 
Comparative Study of Distribution in Primitive and 
Peasant Economies. New York: Academic Press, 1977. 
172 
Schmidt, Steffen w., James C. Scott, Carl Lunde and Laura 
Guasti, eds. Friends, Followers and Factions: A 
Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1977. 
Schoemaker, Robin. The Peasants of El Dorado: Conflict and 
Contradiction in a Peruvian Frontier Settlement. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981. 
Scott, James C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: 
Rebellion and Subsistence in the Southeast Asia. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. 
Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of 
Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1985. 
Selligson, Mitchell A., ed. The Gap Between Rich and Poor: 
Contending Perspectives on the Political Economy of 
Development. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984. 
Sheahan, John. Patterns of Development in Latin America: 
Poverty, Repression and Economic Strategy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987. 
Singelmann, Peter. Structures of Domination and Peasant 
Movements in Latin America. Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1981. 
173 
Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions: A 
Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Spalding, Karen, ed. Essays in the Political Economic and 
Social History of Colonial Latin America. Newark, 
Delaware: University of Delaware, 1982. 
Stepan, Alfred. The State and Society: Peru in Comparative 
Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978. 
Stern, Steve J., ed. Resistance, Rebellion and 
Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th 
Centuries. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987. 
Swift, Jeannine. Economic Development in Latin America. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 
Thomas, Clive Y. The Rise of the Authoritarian State in 
Peripheral Societies. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1984. 
174 
Thorp, Rosemary and Geoffrey Bertram. Peru, 1880-1977: 
Growth and Policy in an Open Economy. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1978. 
Tulchin, Josephs., ed. 
The Modern Period. 
Publishers, 1973. 
Problems in Latin American History: 
New York: Harper and Row 
Walton, John. Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of 
Revolution and Underdevelopment. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984. 
Weller, Robert P., and Scott E. Guggenheim, eds. Power and 
Protest in the Countryside: Studies of Rural Unrest in 
Asia, Europe and Latin America. Durham: Duke Press 
Policy Studies, 1982. 
Whyte, William Foote, and Giorgio Alberti. Power Politics 
and Progress: Social Change in Peru. New York: 
Elsevier, 1976 
Wilber, Charles K., ed. The Political Economy of 
Development and Underdevelopment. New York: Random 
House, Inc., 1988. 
Wolf, Eric R. Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1968. 
175 
Peasants. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1966. 
Wolpe, Harold, ed. The Articulation of Modes of Production: 
Essays from Economy and Society. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1975. 
Wright, Erik Olin. Classes. London: Verso, 1985. 
Wright, Erik Olin, ed. The Debate on the Classes. London: 
Verso, 1989. 
Young, Clifford. The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976. 
176 
PERIODICALS 
Adas, Michael. "Moral Economy or Contest State?: Elite 
Demands and The Origins of Peasant Protest in Southeast 
Asia." Journal of Social History 13, no. 4 
(Summer 1980): 521-46. 
Blanchard, Peter. "The Recruitment of Workers in the 
Peruvian Sierra at the Turn of the Century: The 
Engache System." Inter-American Economic Affairs 33, 
no. 3 (Winter 1980):63-83. 
Bodemann, Michal Y. "Class Rule as Patronage: Kinship, 
Local Ruling Cliques and the State in Rural Sardinia." 
The Journal of Peasant Studies 9, no. 2 (January 1982): 
147-75. 
Booth, John A. "Political Participation in Latin America: 
Levels, Structures, Context, Concentration and 
Rationality." Latin American Research Review 14, 
no. 3: 29-59. 
Brass, Tom. "Cargos and Conflicts: The Fiesta System and 
Capitalist Development in Eastern Peru." The Journal 
of Peasant Studies 13, no. 3 (April 1986): 45-62. 
177 
"Class Formation and Class Struggle in La 
Convencion, Peru." The Journal of Peasant Studies 
7, no. 4 (July 1980): 427-57. 
"Trotskyism, Hugo Blanco and the Ideology 
of a Peruvian Peasant Movement." The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 16, no. 2 (Janury 1989): 173-97. 
"Unfree Labor and Capitalist Restructuring 
in the Agrarian Sector: Peru and India." The Journal 
of Peasant Studies 1, no. 1 (October 1985): 50-77. 
Brustein, William, and Margaret Levi. "The Geography of 
Rebellion: Rulers, Rebels and Regions, 1500-1700." 
Theory and Society 16, no. 4 (July 1987): 467-93. 
Byres, T. J. "Modes of Production and Non-European, 
Pre-Colonial Societies: The Nature and Significance of 
the Debate." The Journal of Peasant Studies 12, 
nos. 2 and 3 (January/April 1985): 1-18. 
Caballero, Jose Maria. "Agriculture and The Peasantry under 
Industrialization Pressures: Lessons from the Peruvian 
Experience." Latin American Research Review 19, 
no . 2 ( 19 8 4 ) : 3-41 . 
178 
Chevalier, Jacques M. "There is Nothing Simple about Simple 
Commodity Production." The Journal of Peasant Studies, 
10, no. 4 (July 1983): 153-86. 
Chinchilla, Norma Stoltz, and James Lowell Dietz. "Toward A 
New Understanding Of Development and Underdevelopment. " 
In Dependency and Marxism: Toward a Resolution of the 
Debate edited by Ronald H. Chilcote. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1982. 
Eckstein, Susan. "Revolutions and the Restructuring of 
National Economies: The Latin American Experience." 
Comparative Politics 17, no. 4 (July 1985): 473-93. 
Evans, Grant. "The Accursed Problem: Communists and 
Peasants." Peasant Studies 15, no. 2 (Winter 1988): 
73-102. 
Fisher, John. "Royalism, Regionalism, and Rebellion in 
Colonial Peru, 1808-1815." Hispanic American 
Historical Review 59, no. 2 (May 1979): 232-57. 
Foster-Carter, Aidan. "The Modes of Production 
Controversy." The New Left Review 107 (January-February 
1980): 47-77. 
179 
Galli, Rosemary. "Rural Development as Social Control: 
International Agencies and Class Struggle in the 
Colombian Countryside." Latin American Perspectives 
5, no. 4 (Fall 1978): 71-89. 
Gonzales, Michael J. "Recent Contributions to Andean 
Ethnohistory." Peasant Studies 12, no. 4 (Summer 
1985): 287-93. 
Green, Jerold D. "Countermobilization as a Revolutionary 
Form." Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (January 1984): 
153-69. 
Grieshaber, Erwin P. "Hacienda-Indian Community Relations 
and Indian Acculturation: An Historiographical Essay." 
Latin American Research Review 14, no. 3 (1979): 
107-12. 
Gudmundson, Lowell. "Peasant, Farmer, Proletariat: Class 
Formation in a Smallholder Coffee Economy, 1850-1950." 
Hispanic American Historical Review 69, no. 2 
(May 1989): 221-57. 
Harris, Richard. "Marxism and the Agrarian Question in 
Latin America." Latin American Perspectives 5, no. 4 
(Fall 1978): 2-26. 
180 
Henfrey, Colin. "Dependency, Modes Of Production and the 
Class Analysis of Latin America." In Dependency and 
Marxism: Towards A Resolution Of The Debate, Edited by 
Ronald H. Chilcote. Bolder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1982. 
Hobsbawm, E.J.E. "A Case of Nee-Feudalism: La Convencion, 
Peru." Journal of Latin American Studies 1, no. 1 
( 1969): 31-50. 
Hunt, David. "Peasant Movements and Communal Property 
during the French Revolution." Theory and Society 17, 
no. 2(March 1988): 255-83. 
Jackson, Robert H. "The Decline of the Hacienda in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia: The Case of the Sacaba Valley, 
1870-1929." Hispanic American Historical Review 
69, no. 2 (May 1989): 259-80. 
Johnson, Howard. "Merchant Credit and the Dispossession of 
the Cocoa Peasantry in Trinidad in the Late Nineteenth 
Century." Peasant Studies 15, no. 1 
(Fall 1987): 27-38. 
Janvry, Alain de, and Lynn Ground. "Types and Consequences 
of Land Reform in Latin America." Latin American 
Perspectives 5, no. 4 (Fall 1978): 90-112. 
181 
Kincaid, A.Douglas. "Peasants into Rebels: Community and 
Class in Rural El Salvador." Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 29, no. 3 (July 1987): 
466-94. 
Langer, Erik, D. "Labor Strikes and Reciprocity on 
Chuquisaca Haciendas." Hispanic American Historical 
Review 5 no. 2 (May 1985): 255-77. 
Larson, Brooke. "Rural Rhythms of Class Conflict in 
Eighteenth-Century Cochabamba." Hispanic American 
Historical Review 60, no. 3 (August 1980): 407-30. 
Lemarchand, Rene. "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in 
Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in 
Nation-Building." The American Political Science 
Review 66, no. 1 (March 1972): 68-101. 
Luong, Hy Van. "Agrarian Unrest from an Anthropological 
Perspective: The Case of Vietnam." Comparative 
Politics 17, no. 2 (January 1985): 153-71. 
Mallon, Florencia E. "Peasants and Rural Laborers in 
Pernanbuco, 1955-1964." Latin American Perspectives, 
5, no. 4(Fall1978): 49-69. 
182 
Meillassoux, Claude. "The Economic Bases of Demographic 
Reproduction: From Domestic Mode of Production to 
Wage-Earning." The Journal Of Peasant Studies 11, 
no. 1 (October 1983): 50-61. 
Montoya, Rodrigo. "Changes in Rural Class Structure under 
the Peruvian Agrarian Reform." Latin American 
Perspectives 5, no. 4 (Fall 1978): 113-29. 
Marner, Magnus. "Economic Factors and Stratification in 
Colonial Spanish America with Regard to Elites." 
Hispanic American Historical Review, 63 no.2 (May 
1983): 335-69. 
"The Spanish American Hacienda: A Survey 
of Recent Research and Debate." Hispanic American 
Historical Review 53, no. 2 (May 1973): 183-216. 
Neocosmos, Michael. "Marx's Third Class: Capitalist Landed 
Property and Capitalist Development." The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 13, no. 3 (April 1986): 5-44. 
Pie!, Jean. "The Place of the Peasantry in the National 
Life of Peru in the Nineteenth Century." Past and 
Present 46, (February 1970): 108-33. 
183 
Popkin, Samuel. "The Rational Peasant: The Pollitical 
Economy of Peasant Society" Theory and Society 9, 
no. 3 (1980): 411-71. 
Partes, Alejandro. "Latin American Class Structures: Their 
Composition and Change during the Last Decades." Latin 
American Research Review 20, no. 3: 7-39. 
Ramirez, Susan E. "The Duena de Indios: Thoughts on the 
Consequences of the Shifting Bases of Power of the 
Curacas de los Viejos Antiguos under the Spanish in 
Sixteenth-Century Peru." Hispanic American Historical 
Review 67, no. 4 (November 1987): 575-610. 
Rodrick, Dani. "Rural Transformation and Peasant Political 
Orientation in Egypt and Turkey." Comparative Politics 
14, no. 4 (July 1982): 417-42. 
Scott, C.D. "Peasants, Proletarianization and the 
Articulation of Modes of Production: the Case of Sugar 
Cane Cutters in Northern Peru, 1940-69." The Journal 
of Peasant Studies 3, no. 3 (April 1976): 321-41. 
Scott, James C. "Hegemony and the Peasantry." Politics and 
Society 7, no. 3 (1977): 267-96. 
184 
"Patron-Client Politics and Political 
Change in Southeast Asia." The American Political 
Science Review 66, no. 1 (March 1972): 91-113. 
"Peasant Revolution: A Dismal Science." 
Comparative Politics 9, no. 2 (January 1977): 
231-48. 
"Protest and Profanation: Agrarian 
Revolt and the Little Tradition." Parts 1 and 2. 
Theory and Society 4, nos.1, 2 (Spring 1977): 1-38, 
211-46. 
"Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants 
and Commissars." Theory and Society 7, nos. 1, 2 
(January-March 1979): 97-134. 
Singelmann, Peter. "Rural Collectivization and Dependent 
Capitalism: The Mexican Ejido." Latin American 
Perspectives 5, no. 3 (Summer 1978): 38-59. 
Skocpol, Theda. "Social Revolutions and Mass Military 
Mobilization." World Politics 40, no. 2 (January 
1988): 147-68. 
"What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" 
Comparative Politics 14, no. 3 (April 1982): 
351-74. 
185 
Soiffer, Stephen M, and Gary N. Howe. "Patrons, Clients and 
the Articulation of the Modes of Production: An 
Examination of the Penetration of Capitalism into 
Peripheral Agriculture in Northeast Brazil." The 
Journal of Peasant Studies 9, no. 2 (January 1982): 
176-206. 
Spalding, Karen. "Hacienda-Village Relations in Andean 
Society to 1830." Latin American Perspectives 2, 
no. 1 (Spring 1975): 107-21. 
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. "Capitalism and the Peasant in 
Mexico." Latin American Perspectives 5, no. 3 (Summer 
1978): 27-37. 
Stavig, Ward. "Ethnic Conflict, Moral Economy and 
Population in Rural Cuzco on the Eve of the Thupa Amaro 
II Rebellion." Hispanic American Historical Review 68, 
no. 4 (November 1988): 737-69. 
Stinchcombe, Arthur. "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural 
Class Relations." The American Journal of Sociology 
67, no. 2 (September 1961): 165-76. 
Thompson, E.P. "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in 
the Eighteenth Century." Past and Present 50, 
(February 1971): 76-132. 
186 
Young, Eric Van. "Islands in the Storm: Quiet Cities and 
Violent Countrysides in the Mexican Independence 
Era." Past and Present 97, no. 118 (February 
1988): 130-55. 
187 
UNPUBLISHED PAPER 
Craig, Wesley William. "From Hacienda to Community: An 
Analysis of Solidarity and Social Change in Peru." 
Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1967. 
188 
